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ABSTRACT
NEW SOLUTION FOR OLD PROBLEM: REVIEWING THE
INTERNATIONAL PEACE-BUILDING EXPERIMENT IN KOSOVO
Bekim Enver Sejdiu
M.A., Department of International Relations
         Supervisor: Doc. Dr. Hasan Ünal
June 2005
This thesis analyzes the prospects for solution of the protracted Kosovo problem,
through the international peace-building mission launched in 1999. It confronts the
basic premises upon which is constructed the peace-building concept, the latter
viewed in the context of peace operation techniques, with the nature of the ethnic
conflict of Kosovo.  The thesis argues that implementation of socioeconomic and
political transformations along the model of capitalist liberal democracy, which is
the underlying strategy of peace-building missions, is not sufficient condition for
the solution of the Kosovo problem. This assumption is based on two arguments.
First, the international peace-building operation in Kosovo does not tackle the very
root of the Kosovo problem, namely the question of political/legal status of the
territory, nor it offers any clear prospect for solving this issue. Second, this
operation leaves intact the direct cause of the violent expression of the Kosovo
problem, namely the aggressive Serbian nationalism and the particular
sociopolitical context which gave rise to it. The thesis argues that there can be no
viable solution for the final status of Kosovo, which would contradict the will of
iv
the majority of its population. Finally, the thesis suggests that the stability and
prosperity of the Western Balkans, including the democratic transformation of
Serbia, which is of crucial importance in this regard, are indivisibly dependent
from the incorporation of this region under the umbrella of Euro-Atlantic political,
economic and security structures.
Keywords: Kosovo conflict, history, myth, Serbian nationalism, peace-building,
liberalism, Euro-Atlantic integrations.
vÖZET
ESKİ SORUNA YENİ ÇÖZÜM: KOSOVA’DAKİ ULUSLARARASI
BARIŞI SAĞLAMA TECRÜBESİNİN GÖZDEN GEÇİRİLMESİ
Bekim Enver Sejdiu
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal
Haziran 2005
İşbu Tez, sürüncemedeki Kosova sorununun olası çözüm yollarını 1999 yılında
başlatılmış olan uluslararası barışı sağlama misyonu ışığında tetkik etmektedir.
Tez ayrıca barış operasyonu yöntemleri ve Kosova’daki etnik çatışmaların niteliği
bağlamında ele alınan Barışı Sağlama kavramının dayanağını oluşturan temelleri
gözden geçirmektedir. İşbu Tez, Barışı Sağlama misyonların temel stratejisini
teşkil eden kapitalist liberal demokrasinin ve sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi
değişimlerin gerçekleştirlmesinin, Kosova sorununun çözümü için yeterli bir koşul
olmadığını öne sürmektedir. Bu varsayım iki temel sava dayandırılmıştır.
Bunlardan birincisi, Kosova’daki uluslararası barışı sağlama operasyonunun
Kosova sorununun köklerine, yani bölgenin siyasi ve hukuki statüsü sorununa,
inmemesi ve bu sorunun çözümüne yönelik açık bir görüşe sahip olmaması ile
ilgilidir. İkincisi ise, bu operasyonun Kosova sorununun şiddetli bir hale
dönüşmesine neden olan asıl nedenine, yani saldırgan Sırp milliyetçiliği ve onun
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yükselişini teşvik eden belli başlı sosyopolitik bağlamına,  dokunulmamış
olmasıdır. İşbu Tez, nüfusun çoğunluğunun iradesi ile çatışır nitelikteki
Kosova’nın nihai statüsü ile ilgili bir çözümün yaşanılır ve tutarlı olamayacağını
savunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak da, bu bağlamda olağanüstü önem arzeden bir konu
olan Sırbistan’ın demokratik dönüşümü de dahil olmak üzere, Batı Balkanlar’ın
istikrarı ve refahı, bu bölgenin Euro-Atlantic siyasal, iktisadi ve güvenlik yapısının
şemsiyesi altında birleştirilmesine vazgeçilmez bir surette bağlıdır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Kosova sorunu, tarih, efsane, Sırp milliyetçiliği, barışı sağlama,
Liberalizm, Euro-Atlantic entegrasyonu.
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1  CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the Berlin Wall, an episode marking symbolically the end of the Cold
War, paved the way for two antagonistic trends. Thus the enthusiasm of those
interpreting that landmark event as a dawn of a new liberal, and hence peaceful, epoch
was fiercely contradicted by the outburst  of many ethnic, religious  and other internal
conflicts, once suppressed by the Cold War security parameters. Paradoxically enough,
the first major “backlash” emerged at “European home,” at least in geographical terms,
namely the Balkans.  There, different ethno-religious groups once living in a common
state called Yugoslavia, from the frontline entrenchments transmitted the message that
indeed a deeper chaos, not a global order constructed upon the premises of capitalist
liberal democracy, could be the prevailing state of affairs in the aftermath of bipolar
world system.
    The Kosovo conflict stands as a single most illustrative case in this regard, not only
because it faithfully exemplifies the severity and complexity of ethno-national questions
in the former Yugoslav space, or because it dragged NATO directly into the conflict, but
also because it became a terrain where the new approaches of international community
to the conflicts of this nature are being tested. It has been a general inclination to see the
international involvement in the Kosovo crisis from the perspective of NATO’s military
intervention and contradictory legal and political debates it triggered. Yet, as this thesis
shows, Kosovo is not a unique case from international relations standpoint only because
2it brought into the surface, perhaps more forcefully than ever before, the long existing
contradiction between the international law vis-à-vis morality and political necessity, a
contradiction that paradoxically remains very acute in the “global world”. Beyond this
context, the post-war international administration over Kosovo turned the latter into a
laboratory for measuring the efficacy of peace-building, which emerged as a new
direction in peace operations technique in the aftermath of the Cold War. This thesis
tries to discern the prospects for putting an end to the protracted ethnic conflict of
Kosovo, through the peace-building mission launched under the UN mandate in 1999. It
argues that the international peace-building mission in Kosovo suffers from two basic
flaws, which make it incapable of solving this complex and old problem, provided that it
will not be followed, or incorporated, by a broader and long-term international plan for
the region.  The first flaw has to do with the basic assumptions upon which is
constructed the peace-building concept. Accordingly, the first hypothesis to be proven
by this work is that the international administration over Kosovo is a deviation from the
basic rationale of peace-building, as it is launched in a “wrong address.” In essence, the
peace-building was invented as a device to change the misbehaving states/nations, once
they were defeated (e.g. Germany and Japan after the World War II, or Afghanistan in
2001), and latter was applied as a response to failed states. This concept rests on the idea
of uprooting the underlying societal causes of violence and conflicts, through
implementing profound liberal democratic transformations (along the lines of the
Western capitalist model).  Drawing on these conceptual and historical explanations, this
work argues that the essential causes of the Kosovo conflict have basically remained
unchallenged by the international peace-building mission. By placing Kosovo under the
international administration and imposing a “social engineering” enterprise upon its
population, while leaving Serbia out of a foreign “tutelage,” the international policy-
3making centers have failed to tackle directly the major source of the conflict in Kosovo
(and former Yugoslavia in general), namely the aggressive nationalist policy of the
Serbian state, and the political and cultural mindset that gave birth to it.
    On the other hand, the historical picture presented in this thesis highlights the fact that
while the violent expression of the Kosovo problem was primarily reflection of the
Serbian attempt to solve this issue by means of force, the very root of the dispute lies on
the conflicting claims of the Albanians and Serbs over Kosovo. Therefore, the next
hypothesis put forward here is that the prospects for final solution of the Kosovo
problem do not depend primarily on the successes of international administration in
imposing democratic transformations on the Kosovar society, but rather from finding a
viable political solution to its status. So far, the international administration in Kosovo
has failed not only to address this issue, but also to clarify the path for its future solution.
And here lies the second major flaw of the peace-building mission in Kosovo.
    This thesis is structured into five chapters, including introduction and conclusion.
Following the Introduction, the second chapter offers a historical mirror of the Kosovo
problem. It starts from the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the time when Kosovo was
forcefully incorporated for the first time within the modern Serbian state, and until 1999
when, following the war with NATO, Serbia was forced to cede its control over Kosovo
to the international community. This chapter delves particularly into the particular
pattern of Serbian nationalism, as a driving force of Serbian violent behavior in their
encounters with the Albanians throughout the modern history. It points out to the
mythical perception of the past and the victim’s identity, as the two most destructive
underpinnings of the Serbian nationalism, imbedded into the national consciousness of
the Serbs by their elite. The third chapter shall elaborate the international peace-building
mission in Kosovo, launched under the UN and NATO’s umbrella in 1999, as a unique
4international attempt to solve this old and intractable problem. It starts by offering an
insight analysis of the peace-building concept, at its theoretical level as well as its
historical application. To this end, it focuses on liberalist paradigm and its product the
democratic peace theory, as ideological framework of the peace-building concept.
Further, it goes on by discerning the conditions and circumstances that support or
obstruct the implementation of Western capitalist model of liberal democracy and
market economy, which is the underlying strategy of peace-building missions. After
having analyzed this concept, the second sub-chapter turns to the current international
peace-building endeavor in Kosovo. Through offering a detailed picture of the
international administration in Kosovo, viewed in the context of peace operation
techniques, this sub-chapter singles out the unique nature of this mission. It also
identifies the features making it a prototype of “multi-dimensional peace operations,”
the latter emerging during the 1990s as a new direction in peacekeeping.  Drawing on
the main findings of the previous chapters, the fourth chapter explores the possibilities
for solution of the Kosovo problem through international peace-building endeavor. It
emphasizes that while the international administration in Kosovo has engineered
meaningful democratic transformations upon the Kosovar society, the political culture in
Serbia, which was the main thrust behind the conflict in Kosovo (and former Yugoslavia
in general), has remained relatively unchanged. In this context, it refers to the obdurate
refusal of the Serbian society to face its ugly past, the strength of the nationalist political
parties and the destructive role of the Orthodox Church and the army, as firm indicators
that the sociopolitical setting which created Milosevic in Serbia has not been defeated
yet. This chapter resumes by reconfirming the underlying argument of this study, which
views the democratic transformation of Serbia, the positive solution of the Kosovo
problem, and wider regional stability, as indivisibly dependent on the viable solution of
5the final status of the latter and broad and long-term commitments of the NATO and EU
to the region. I argue in this thesis in favor of an independent status for Kosovo,
associated with special guarantees for Serbian interests and a meaningful international
tutorship role (at least for a certain time period). This suggestion is centered on the
argument that this solution would embrace morality- as it would deny to the Serbian
state the right to rule over Kosovo, because they have continuously abused it at the
expense of the Kosovar Albanians. It would also reflect political stability and democratic
principles- as that solution is very likely to be acceptable to the great majority of
population in Kosovo (of whom around 90% are Albanians).  Finally, the thesis suggests
that the future of the Kosovo problem and wider regional stability, are indispensably
bound to the international commitment to the region. It refers in this direction to the twin
international approach of maintaining strong military presence and keeping high on the
political agenda the process of the regional integration within the Euro-Atlantic
structures (European Union and NATO). The past and the present of this region
convincingly argue that this is the only way to put a final lid on the image of conflicts
and cleavages, which for centuries has being associated with the Balkans (or at least its
Western part). This scenario would lead to the political (and even cultural) assimilation
of the region by the Euro-Atlantic framework. First and foremost, it bolsters the creation
of a sociopolitical and economic context permissive to the transformation of Serbia,
which, as this thesis shall try to demonstrate, is an indispensable condition for the
stability of the region. The concluding chapter will summarize the main arguments of
the thesis.
    The construction of the thesis, in accordance with its structure, does not follow
uniform methodology. Thus, the second chapter, following introduction, is structured
based on narrative description of the major events forming a historical mirror of the
6Kosovo problem, their analysis, and main conclusions drawn thereupon. The rest of the
thesis (the subsequent chapters) develops through elaboration of the theoretical
underpinnings and practical application of the peace-building missions, and outlines its
operationalization in Kosovo. It establishes an ideological link between the peace-
building and democratic-peace theory, through using historical (the ideological
dimensions of the end of the Cold War) and conceptual (the strong presence of liberal
paradigms in peace-building missions) variables. Finally the study confronts the basic
assumptions underpinning the peace-building concept with the historical and
sociopolitical realities of the Kosovo problem, viewed in the context of Albanian-
Serbian conflict. The thesis relies on various sources, mainly of secondary character,
including books, academic journals and, to limited extent, information obtained from the
internet and newspapers.  It also uses primary sources (e.g. the UN Resolutions and
other similar and related sources), when such usage is possible and beneficial.
7  CHAPTER 2
KOSOVO IN RETROSPECT
The abrupt break up of the Yugoslav state at the closing decade of the twentieth century,
and particularly the violent path in which this drama unfolded, actuated bewildered
observers to rush for finding out and explaining the real causes of that landmark event.
And as a general rule when it comes to explaining the Balkans, it became somewhat
fashionable to rummage into complex horizons of the region’s history in order to find
the answer as to why the South Slavic state disappeared, and, more importantly, why this
event was so savage. In other words, observing the Yugoslav drama through historical
lenses was invented as the best way to understand the structural reasons for the
dissolution of that state (i.e. was Yugoslavia an “artificial creature” of specific historical
circumstances, and, as a such, doomed to failure?), as well as the socio-political and
cultural factors leading to such a ferocious end. While the discussions in the first domain
– structural causes of the conflict – continue to attract isolated academic curiosity, the
overwhelming popular view created by mass media and public political discourse,
whether within or outside the collapsed Yugoslav state, is that these conflicts were
caused primarily by ethnic hatreds inherited from history. Thus, the origins of Yugoslav
ethnic conflicts were/are usually traced back in centuries. The myths and truths which
are kept alive in the collective memories of the region’s nations throughout their
turbulent past, are though to supply, what John Allcock (2000:2) portrays as “atavistic
8cultural principles,” which supposedly have nurtured the violent inter-ethnic encounters
through the centuries.
    In parallel to that, one of the most common features characterizing the outbreak of
ethnic rivalries and conflicts in former Yugoslavia by the beginning of 1990s was the
use of “historical arguments,” which became the central tool of nationalist political and
intellectual elites. The metaphoric phrase that the Balkans produces more history than it
can be consumed locally became a very sounding symbolism in the Yugoslav nightmare.
Therefore, any academic intrusion into discussing current dynamics and processes
related to Kosovo, as well as predicting the possible future trends is bound to start from
the history of this problem This chapter shall try to identify some key lessons from the
history of the Kosovo conflict, which if neglected render incomplete, not to say abortive,
any attempt to solve this problem.
2.1 Where to start?
The history of the conflict in Kosovo demonstrates how the collective memories of the
past, as displayed and manipulated skillfully by political and religious leaders and
inspired by academic elite, can influence political behavior at present. Indeed, before
becoming political and finally armed battleground Kosovo was an arena of severe fight
between the competing “historical truths” of the Serbs and Albanians.  Alexander Bayerl
(quoted in Mahncke, 2001: 31-79) points out that the first awkward question when
dealing with the history of the Kosovo conflict is where to begin. Actually “the battle of
truths” between the Serbs and Albanians starts exactly at this juncture, namely which is
“the beginning of history” for the Kosovo problem. In Kosovo history is war by other
9means, as Tim Judah (2000) observes metaphorically. The Serbs in general, as Milosevic
faithfully demonstrated, have chosen the medieval ages – creation of the Serbian feudal
state(s), installation in the thirteenth century of the Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox
Church in Peja (Serb. Pec), in today’s western Kosovo, and particularly the year 1389
and the “Kosovo battle” – as a point of reference. Albanians, on the other hand, reacted
by going deeper into the ancient times and by invoking their Illyrian descent or by
referring to Kosovo as a symbol of their national awakening process (Malcolm, 1998).1
However, a part from disregarding the absence of the reliable historical evidences from
those periods, these approaches miss one crucial point, namely the fact that the modern
concept of nation was unknown during the medieval, let aside the ancient times.
Therefore it is hardly arguable that the “Serbs” or “Albanians” at those times understood
themselves along the national lines, as they do today.  Instead, religion, language, or
dynastic rule served as exclusive sources of political and cultural identification up until
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in much the same way as in the other parts of
Europe and wider.
    This chapter will give a historical perspective to this problem, starting from 1912-
1913. The reasons for this, rather “modest”, historical approach are threefold; firstly, this
period (“The Balkan Wars”) marked the first time when (the present day) Kosovo came
under the rule of the modern Serbian state. Secondly, any deeper historical excursion
into Kosovo is bound to overstretch into endless exchange of arguments and counter-
arguments. Obviously, this is out of the limits of this work. And finally, while it is
hardly deniable that the historic experiences do play a role in shaping the present
political problems and patterns, it is amply demonstrated that in the Kosovo case there
                                                          
1 The Albanian awakening process is connected with the so-called “Prizeren League ”, which took place in
Kosovo in  June 10, 1878 (the city of Prizeren is located in southern Kosovo).
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were political and intellectual circles which set the negative direction of this influence.
As Wacht (1998: 15-16) rightly observers:
   if the potentials for mutual enmity can be found in almost any country,
   they have little or no explanatory power in and of themselves. Whether
   they lead to conflict or compromise depends on a host of factors, the
   most important of which centers on the way they are used or abused in
   culture and cultural politics.
It was primarily the Serbian elite that, misusing historical misfortunes and symbols,
provoked national sentiments in order to acquire mass mobilization, with the aim of
realization of Serbian national hegemony in the region.  Above all, Slobodan Milosevic,
whose policy was the major driving force behind the violent dismemberment of
Yugoslavia, rose to power by promising to his fellow Serbs that he would struggle
against “historical injustices” inflicted upon their nation. In his rise to power, he used the
Kosovo cult and the irrational insistence on the mythical importance of Kosovo for the
Serbs.
    The latter two arguments, i.e. the controversial nature of history and the destructive
role of elite in this regard, can very well be demonstrated by one simple example,
namely the battle of Kosovo-1389, and the influence that the Kosovo cult, resulting
thereof, has exercised into the Serbian national conciseness. This example has a very
powerful explanatory force in terms of understanding the destructive pattern of Serbian
nationalism, lately demonstrated during the 1990s. Thus, discussions about the origins of
the ethnic conflict in Kosovo frequently refer to the battle of Kosovo of 1389, when one
Balkan military alliance led by the Serbian ruler, King Llazar, was defeated by the
Ottoman army in the Field of Blackbirds (Alb. Fushë Kosova, Serb. Kosovo-Polje),
which is located near today’s Kosovo’s capital Pristina. Little is known what actually
happened in this fourteenth century battle is, at least it terms of reliable evidence.
According to Serbian historiography, the Serbs after this battle lost their glorious
11
medieval state and came under the “Ottoman yoke”, while their king Lazar was killed.
Outside observers, on the other hand, while agreeing that “disentanglement of myth
from reality,” as John Allcock (2000: 382) underlines, hinder attempts to display a clear
historical account of this event, overwhelmingly accepted that the picture was not as
black and white as Serbian historians usually present it. Thus, by taking a historico-
sociological position, Allcook (2000) displays a picture of two armies representing
complex feudal structures. He goes one by explaining that on the “Turkish side,” an
Ottoman nobility led an army composed not only of Muslims, but also contingents from
other European groups among whom were Serbs (for this point see also Elsie et al, 1997:
12), while on the other side was an army led by the Serbia’s ruler Knez Lazar
Hrebeljanovic and composed of (what he describes as) Serbs, Bosnians, Albanians,
Wallachians, Croats and Hungarians. Along the same lines, Malcolm (1998: 62) refers to
concrete historical evidence demonstrating that some Albanian nobles did take part in
the Lazar’s army.  On the other hand, it is historically undisputed that King Lazar was
one of the Serbian feudal lords, and that his lands were located in the Morava valley in
modern central Serbia (Judah, 2000: 5; Mahncke ed. 2001: 31-79; Malcolm, 1998: 59 .
Indeed, as Bayerl rightly observers (quoted in Mahncke ed, 2001), the death of King
Lazar in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 did not mean the end of Serbia, because there
were several “small Serbias” at the time when Lazar represented one prominent petty
kingdom (the other one being the Northern Serb Kingdom under the ruler George
Brankovic, which existed long after the battle of Kosovo). Serbia was finally occupied
by the Ottomans in 1459 (Judah, 2000: 8).
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     Regardless of the historical controversies over that event, the cult about the Kosovo
battle and the myth about the “heavenly kingdom” (Anzulovic, 1999: 4-5),2 which have
been very strong in the Serbian collective memory centuries later, are products of the
nineteenth century.  Though it was the folk or peasants culture that supplied the oral
tradition, there were the Serbian intellectual circles, such as nationalist writer Vuk
Karadzic, who turned the tales of the Kosovo battle into the foundation of the modern
nationalist ideology (Schwartz, 2000). It was this traumatizing event, supplemented by
latter developments as memorized through “myths” and tales for “holy battles,”
“sufferings” and “great migrations,” which has falsely inculcated the feeling of
victimization on the Serbian collective memory. The defeat at the Kosovo battle, the loss
of the strong medieval state(s) and the alleged abuse of the Serbs during the Ottoman
period, was used by the Serbian elite five centuries later to show that they had been, as
they claim, “suppressed and humiliated” by the Ottoman Muslims. And up to the present
day Serbian history fails to admit that Serbs were just one among other peoples of the
Balkans which were ruled by Ottoman Empire, nothing more and nothing less than that.
Other peoples of the region (e.g., the Bulgarians) lost their medieval kingdoms too, but
such a “loss” did not have a determinant effect in shaping their national consciousness
centuries later. In addition, it is very well known fact that Ottoman state was generally
tolerant towards other religions (see Brude et al. 1983)3 For example, as Dareby
concludes (in Clissold et al. 1966: 87-135), for most of the time the Serbian Orthodox
Church enjoyed autonomy in performing spiritual and social functions.
                                                          
2 Anzulovic explains that: “heavenly Serbia is the dominant Serbian national myth. It was created after the
Turkish penetration into Serbia in the late fourteenth century. The myth attributed the Serb’s defeat at the
Battle of Kosovo to their commitment to the heavenly kingdom, that is, to the choice of moral purity over
the military victory”.
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    And quite normally, as Julie Mertus (1999: 2) observers, when the feeling of
victimization becomes part of identity it is very easy to identify an enemy.
Consequently, identifying an “historical enemy” became a routine task of the Serbian
nationalist intelligentsia and politicians whenever they needed, whether for personal or
“national interest.” Thus almost the first thing to be done by the new Serbian state
created in 1878 was to expel and exterminate the “Muslims,” whom they regarded as
Ottoman remnants and who by and large were Albanian, from its southern flank.4
Identification of “historical enemies” and the need to “prevent the repetition of historical
misfortunes” continued to be advanced as a paramount necessity by the Serbian
nationalist leadership up until the 1990s. In this spirit, protection against the “Croatian
fascists,” or “Bosnian Islamists,” became the central element of Serbian nationalist
rhetoric at the outset of the Yugoslav dissolution wars (Magas, 1993: 305). And yet, the
Kosovo metaphor and the myth about the “heavenly kingdom” was a guiding paradigm
in all turbulent moments. In analyzing the role of this myth in Serbian violent political
behavior in the beginning of 1990s, Anzulovic (1999: 5) quotes the Serbian Orthodox
bishop Jevtic Atanasije, who, in light of the Serbian aggressive campaigns in Slovenia
and Croatia in 1991, reaffirmed the role of the Kosovo myth in the following sentence:
      I think that Kosovo covenant of the Serbian people, that is their general
      orientation toward, and in critical situations definite commitment to, the
       Heavenly Kingdom and not to an earthly one, must be pointed out as
      a special characteristic of the spiritual life of the Orthodox Serbs.
Yet, Serbia’s commitment to the “heavenly kingdom,” and the indoctrination with
extreme nationalism resulting thereupon, as it will be shown subsequently, proved to be
                                                          
4 Tim Judah (2000), fore example, argues that  when Serbs took  the city of Nis  (which is today the 3d
biggest city in Serbia), a quarter of the city was Albanian.
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very tragic first and foremost for the Albanians, but also for others, including the Serbs
themselves.
2. 2. Kosovo under the Serbian state: from the Balkan
        Wars of 1912 –1913 to the first Yugoslavia
Although the independent Serbian state, recognized internationally at the Congress of
Berlin in1878, included a significant number of Albanians within its borders, Kosovo
remained under Ottoman rule up until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. This period
witnessed radical changes in the geopolitical landscape of the Balkans. The first half of
1912 was characterized by a large scale Albanian uprising against the, newly
established, Young Turk Government in Istanbul. Although the motivations for this
uprising were mixed, the key element was demand for more political, cultural and
economic autonomy of the Albanian lands under Ottoman rule. The insurgents, after
having achieved great successes, including the occupation of Skopje (Alb. Shkupi),
stopped the insurgency following guarantees from the Ottoman Government that their
demands were accepted (Malcolm, 1998: 239-248). Benefiting from the Ottoman
exhaustion in the Balkans (particularly from the Albanian rebellion), and in the battles
against the French and Italian armies in Morocco, Libya and elsewhere, Bulgaria,
Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, obviously supported by Russia, attacked Ottoman
troops with the aim of driving them completely out of Europe. The Orthodox allies
succeeded in driving Ottoman army almost totally out of its European possessions. In
response to these radical changes of the geopolitical map of the region, and especially in
reaction to the occupation of their lands by Orthodox neighbors (Greece, Serbia and
Montenegro), Albanians declared their independent state  on 28 November 1912, in the
15
port city of Vlora (Southern Albania). The Treaty of London, signed in May 1913,
recognized the Albanian independent state but left outside almost half of the Albanian
inhabited territories in the Balkans, including Kosovo which became part of Serbia and
Montenegro respectively (Malcolm, 1998). Yet few months after their victories, the
Balkan Orthodox allies engaged in another Balkan war, but this time among themselves.
The conflict was triggered by the old antagonism between the Bulgaria and Serbia over
the control of present day Macedonia, while both also competed with Greece for the
control of today’s Greek Macedonia. The Peace of Bucharest signed in August 1913
reconfirmed the new de facto situation, recognizing the Albanian borders pretty much
along the same lines as today, while Kosovo’s position under Serbia and Montenegro
was reconfirmed (see Mahncke ed. 2001: 64-68).
   The importance of this landmark historical period for the Albanians and Serbs, and
thus for the Kosovo question, does not lay solely on the new territorial arrangements,
which, while leaving both sides unsatisfied5, obviously were highly to the detriment of
the former. The anger of the Albanians who were left out of their national state was
further exacerbated by the harsh treatment prepared for them by the “new rulers”.  Thus
as soon as the Serbs returned to their “heavenly kingdom” they started to manifest brutal
policy towards the Albanians, whereby just in 1912, according to some reports around
20,000 Albanians were killed and many more expelled, especially to Turkey (Judah,
2000: 19-21).  This treatment of Albanian population by the Serbs was, as Elsie (1997:
26) portrays it, “in blatant contrast with grandeur of their medieval history.” He goes
onby explaining that:
   The liberal constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia in the nineteenth and twentieth
    was not valid for Kosovo. There the government orders were carried out by decrees
   and in an extremely oppressive manner. The government in Belgrade held the view
                                                          
5 The Serbs were denied the outlet to Albanian Adriatic sea coasts, mostly as a result of the strong
opposition from Austro-Hungarian state (see Mahncke, 2001).
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   that the Albanians were not a people, but rather a collection of tribes divided and
   fighting among themselves, who had no common language, writing or religion . . .
Like in 1878, the oppressive campaign against the Albanians was not eruption of
the”ancient hatred” between the two nations. Rather, it was inspired and orchestrated
from above; namely the atrocities were committed primarily by the State armed forces,
or paramilitaries sponsored by government, with the blessing of a large part of religious
leaders and intelligentsia. The immediate motives for this policy, as many reporters of
that time noticed, were to change the ethnic balance that was clearly in favor of the
Albanians. These political reasons were noticed by Lev Bronshein, or better know as
Leon Trotsky, who at that time covered this event as a journalist for the Ukrainian
newspaper Kievskaia Mysl. He describes the situation in Kosovo in the immediate
aftermath of the Balkan Wars in the following terms (quoted in Malcolm, 1998: 253):
“The Serbs in Old Serbia, in their national endeavor to correct data in the ethnographical
statistics that are not quite favorable to them, are engaged quite simply in systematic
extermination of Muslims.” This policy ignited furious reactions, not only from outside,
but also in Serbia proper. The fiercest critic of the anti-Albanian campaign was the
leader of the Serbia Social Democratic Party Dimitrije Tucovic. Being a direct witness
of the atrocities committed against the Albanian population, he described the situation in
the following words (quoted in Elsie, 1997: 26):
         The Serb soldiers were obsessed with the vengeance. Even their clergy called upon
          them to take revenge for Kosovo, that is, for the Battle of Kosovo Polje. When the Turks
          conquered the region in the Middle Ages, they had no intention of whipping out
          peoples they had conquered, as the governments of the Balkan bourgeois are now
          endeavoring to do…
The bitter experience of the Albanians in the first years of Serbian rule had two long-
standing effects for the Serbo-Albanian relations. First, it convinced the Albanians that
they were enemy by definition in the Serbian state, and consequently it triggered a
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permanent resistance against any kind of Serbian rule. Second, and in connection to the
first, Albanians became natural allies of whoever was to fight against the Serbs in the
turbulent decades to come. Therefore, it was not surprising that for the majority of
Albanians occupation of Kosovo and Serbia proper by the Austro-Hungarian, German
and Bulgarian troops in 1915-1916 actually meant liberation (although many Albanian
Kaçaks6 resisted the new rulers too). And the Albanians were not mistaken in their
perceptions, as the new rulers showed greater sensitivity towards Albanian cultural and
political rights, allowing, among others, education in the Albanian language, and other
cultural and political rights that did not exist before (Malcolm, 1998: 261). On the other
hand, for many Albanians the new situation meant that the opportunity was created to
take revenge for their plight of 1912. The revenge was to be taken against the defeated
Serbian army, which in its desperate retreat to Corfu (Greece) had to pass through the
mountainous borders between Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro, where the isolated
detachments of the Serbian army, enfeebled by cold and hunger, became an easy prey of
Albanian guerrillas (Malcolm, 1998: 20-22). Yet by 1918 the course of international
developments worked for Serbs again, as the defeat of the Central Powers meant that
Serbia was on the side of winners of the First World War, namely the Entente states.
Consequently, by 1918 the Serbian army reoccupied Kosovo, and on 1 December 1918
the new sate, called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came into existence.
                                                          
6 The term Kaçak, in Turkish “fugitive”, was associated with the Albanian illegal groups fighting the
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2.3  Kosovo and Albanians in the First Yugoslavia
It is often claimed that the reasons for dissolution of Yugoslavia(s) cannot be properly
understood without understanding, in the first place, the reasons for its creation. The
factors and circumstances that lead to the creation of Yugoslavia were as complex and
multifaceted as those triggering its violent disintegration in the 1990s. As such, any
comprehensive analysis of the life of Yugoslav state would require far more efforts and
space than the scope of this thesis can offer. A summarized picture of the context giving
birth to the first Yugoslavia in 1918, initially called the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and
Slovenes, displays an interaction of internal and external factors. In general terms,
creation of the South Slavic state (excluding Bulgaria), was a direct product of the
interaction between the radical changes of European geopolitical context, by the
beginning of twentieth century, and internal processes at the elite level among the two
major would-be Yugoslav groups, namely Serbs and Croats. Most of the observers agree
that the Yugoslav idea was firstly articulated during the 1830s – 1840s, among the small
group of intellectuals (Wacht et al. 1998: 1).  The idea was particularly advanced by the
Croatian writers, such as Ljudevit Gaji or Bishop Strossmayer, and supported by some
Slovenian counterparts, e.g. Jernej Kopitar, who emphasized the common ethnic,
cultural and linguistic features among the South Slavic groups (Cohen, 1995: 4). The
main thrust behind the Croat (and perhaps the Slovenian) enthusiasm for Yugoslavism,
however, was the perceived threat from the Hungarian cultural influence and, later, from
the Italian territorial ambitions on the Eastern Adriatic coasts (Clissold et al, 1966: 154-
170). On the Serbian side, clouted by the national awakening euphoria, the ambitions
                                                                                                                                                                          
Turks, Serbs in 1912 – 1913, and later the Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians, (Judah, 200: 21).
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and ideas for creation of the strong Serbian state comprising all Serbs began to take a
concrete shape. This idea was first articulated officially by one of the towering figures of
Serbian nationalism, Ilija Grasanin (Interior Minister of the Princedom of Serbia from
1844 - 1874), who in his Nacertanje (Ang. Outline) laid out long-term Serbian political
objectives. The central thread of the Grasanin’s idea was that the Serbs should dominate
the Balkans once the Ottoman Empire collapsed (Judah, 1997: 56-60). The creation of
independent Serbia in 1878, and perhaps unification of Germany and Italy few years
before, further bolstered Serbia’s aspirations. In the lenses of Serbian elite, their state
had to become a Piedmont; a force that should unite the South Slavic subjects of the
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire under Serbian domination. The political space
vacated by the dismemberment of the Ottoman (1912) and Austro-Hungarian (1919)
Empires, and the fact that Serbia emerged as a consolidated state with a relatively strong
military apparatus, gave a new impetus to the Yugoslav project. Still, perceptions about
the common South Slavic state under Serb tutelage continued to dominate in Belgrade.
Along these lines, Serbia’s Prime Minister Nikolla Pasic declared in 1914 that “he will
welcome the union of the South Slav lands with the Serb Kingdom” (Cohen, 1995: 12).
   The new monarchic state – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – came into
existence as a result of negotiations between the elite of its major groups, without any
reference to popular consent. It consisted of different groups which, a part from being
divided along religious (Catholic, Orthodox and Muslims), and ethnic (Slavs, Albanians,
Hungarians etc) lines, had had different collective experiences shaping their nation-
building processes. Above all, visions about the new state among the elites of two major
groups – Serbs and Croats – were not only different but also conflicting. Henceforth,
throughout its existence Yugoslav political life was dominated by two contradicting
concepts about the form of governance, stemming from the Serbian unitary tendencies
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and the Croatian inclination towards more decentralized and asymmetric models of
organization (Cohen, 1995: 14). In addition to the geopolitical changes at the
international realm, these conflicting tendencies actually played a major role in the break
up of the first and second Yugoslav states. Overall, the new state created on the 1st of
December 1918, which was based on royal unitarism under the Serbian Karadjordevic
dynasty (the 1921 constitution), represented a framework for realization of the Serbian
national program, based on hegemony over the other groups.
   The new Yugoslav state incorporated Kosovo within its boundaries, without any
specific legal status (it was simply regarded as an integral part of Serbia), against the
will of its predominantly Albanian population. Most importantly, the government in
Belgrade lost the opportunity to make a new beginning in terms of treating the Kosovar
Albanians, who were the biggest non-Slavic group. Instead of trying to endear the
Albanians to the new state, the Government, which was controlled by Serbs, acted quite
the opposite. It denied the minority status to Albanians, and hence minority rights
guaranteed by the new system established under the League of Nations (Elsie et al.
1997: 32-33). As the Serb author Dimitrije Bogdanovic recognizes in his Kosovo Book,
the Albanians were excluded totally from minority rights recognized under the new
system, which were granted to other (significantly smaller) minorities, such as Italians,
Germans or Hungarians (quoted in Elsie et al. 1997). Obviously, the ultimate aim of this
policy was Serbianization of Kosovo. The leading Serbian intellectual Vasa Cubrilovic,
who was the most prominent member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and
who had been a member of the group which killed the Hapsburg Archduke Ferdinand in
Sarajevo in 1914, expressed this strategy in the most articulate and radical form. In his
memorandum entitled “The expulsion of the Albanians,” published in March of 1937, he
observes that (cited in Elsie et al. 1997: 12):
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     The Serbian authorities are trying to solve the major ethnic problems of the Balkans
      by Western methods. Gradual colonization has failed. There is no possibility of
      assimilating the Albanians as a people. The only way and the only means to cope with
      them is the brute force of an organized state  in which we have always been
      superior.
 The first step to be undertaken in pursuit of the “non-Western methods” was the
abolition of Albanian schools, which had been set up by the Austrians. Furthermore, the
Belgrade regime started to implement a strategy to change the ethnic balance of Kosovo,
by expelling Albanians (mainly towards Turkey) and on the other hand bringing Serbian
and Montenegrin colonists to Kosovo. Thus, around 120, 000 people are thought to have
immigrated to Turkey between 1910-1920 (Judah, 2000: 22). On the other hand, the new
Yugoslav (Serb) state twice during the inter-war period implemented the so-called
“Agrarian reform and colonization”, which meant simply that the land of Albanians was
given to the new Serb colonists who come mostly from  Montenegro (Poulton, 1991:
57–61). Discrimination against Albanians, quite normally, sparked political and military
resistance throughout the lifetime of the first Yugoslavia. The Serbian strategy to correct
the ethnic structure through harsh methods did not reach any meaningful success, nor
did the Albanian resistance to put an end to their oppression. The only significant
achievement, however, was further alienation of Albanians by the Serbian/Yugoslav
state and sharpening of distrust and chasm between the two nations.
2.4 Kosovo and Albanians in the Second Yugoslavia
During the Second World War (WWII) Yugoslavia underwent a civil war, whereby old
ethnic rivalries and grievances and new ideological differences pitted different groups
against each other, resulting in more casualties that those caused by the Nazi occupation.
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WWII brought onto the surface the complexity and severity of ethno-political questions
in Yugoslavia. It also highlighted the crucial lesson, to be repeated fifty years latter, that
the destiny of the Yugoslav state was inherently bound to external factors. The fact that
the collapse of the League of Nation’s system (1914), and the end of the Cold War
(1989), allowed ethno-political animosities in Yugoslavia to take a violent expression
underlines the corollary that the very survival of the Yugoslav state was heavily
dependent on external geopolitical circumstances. Yet, the external context again
worked in favor of a new Yugoslav state when Axis powers were defeated, while the
Yugoslav communists, who under the leadership of Josip Broz-Tito had been fighting
the Nazis, emerged as allies of the victorious Entente coalition.
   During WWII, the biggest part of Kosovo joined Albania, which was annexed by Italy,
one part of it remained under the Germans (northeast), and even Bulgarians took control
over some territories (Vickers, 1998: 121). During the Italian-German occupation,
Kosovar Albanians acquired their own administration, police, courts, schools and other
cultural institutions (Elsie et al. 1997: 37-38), none of which existed before. Due to this,
it is not surprising that the communist appeal for an anti-fascist war in Kosovo met with
little enthusiasm (unlike in Albania). Rather, Albanians were preoccupied with
retaliation against the Serbian colons, brought to Kosovo during the interwar period.
Moreover, the expulsion of Serbian colons from Kosovo, which obviously was not
carried out “humanely,” had been supported even by the Germans, although they “called
for adoption of peaceful and reasonable way” (Malcolm, 1998: 293-294). In an attempt
to convince the Albanians that the new beginning was unfolding, Yugoslav/Serb and
Albanian communists met in Northern Albania (Bujan), in the New Yearnight of 1943
where they signed a declaration bestowing upon the Kosovars the right on self-
determination, including secession, after the war (Horvat, 1988: 53-56). This eventually
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failed because of obstructions from the Serbian side, and an uprising in Kosovo took
place in 1944. It was quelled by Yugoslav communist regime only in late May 1945, and
Kosovo was put under military rule until the July of that year (Horvat, 1988: 39). In the
same year a communist “Assembly of National Representatives of Kosovo and
Metohija”7 decided, obviously without popular consent, that the province should join the
“Federal Serbia,” with limited regional autonomy (Magas, 1993: 34; Malcolm, 1998:
315-317).
    The new communist regime was aware that accommodating the national questions,
and building the broken bonds between the major national groups, was the biggest
challenge where the very survival of socialist Yugoslavia was tested. Initially, borrowing
from the Soviet concept, the Yugoslav communists maintained that the creation of a new
supranational culture/identity, based on “socialist values” was fully compatible with the
flourishing of particularistic ethno-national cultures (Cohen, 1995: 22-24). The
communist framework for creation of the new “Yugoslav identity” through the “socialist
revolution” and “brotherhood and unity formula,” was built on three pillars; first, a
single party system; second, the federal state structure; third, socioeconomic
development based on socialist dogma (Cohen: 1995).  Eventually, this approach was
abandoned by the beginning of the 1960s, and, instead of creating a supranational
identity, the communist establishment tried to accommodate national issues by frequent
constitutional arrangements, and by distributing more power at the republican and
provincial levels. Wacht (1998: 229) observes that the abandonment of attempts to
cultural nation-building on the part of political and cultural elite created conditions for
the collapse of the Yugoslav state. This conclusion, however, disregards the crucial fact
that changing the 1960s were responses to the dysfunctional political and economic
                                                          
7 “Metohija” was a purely Serbian geographical term (for Western Kosovo).
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system, and indeed they marked a significant move towards more decentralized form of
governance (Ganon, 1994: 130-165). These changes triggered reactions among the
conservative elite, particularly in Serbia where some circles began to argue that the
reforms were to the detriment of the Serbian nation, and that they were pursued by the
“historical enemies” of Serbia (Ganon, 1994).  Although it went without saying, these
transformations and the controversies they triggered, brought into the surface the old
conflict between the different concepts of power sharing within the Yugoslav state
(centralized versus decentralized). Eventually, conflicting tendencies were quelled only
after the big purges were carried out by Tito, at the Federal level as well as in the ranks
of the Croatian communist party -the so called “Croatian Spring” (Ganon, 1994).
    Unlike in the first Yugoslavia, this time the particular ethno-cultural identity of
Albanians was legally recognized (starting with the constitution of 1946). Due to this
fact, political developments and changes within the Yugoslav system were felt in
Kosovo perhaps more than anywhere else. Obviously, the decline of Serbian dominance,
and hence distribution of more power at the regional level, resulted in advancement of
the political-legal position of Kosovo. In fact, during the first two decades of Socialist
Yugoslavia, Albanians were underrepresented in public life in Kosovo, let alone the
Federal bodies, although they made up the third biggest ethnic group.8 This situation
started to change for better during the second half of the 1960s.9 Two particular events
bolstered this trend; first, removal of the Yugoslav Minister of Interior, of Serbian
origin, Aleksandar Rankovic (1966), who had pursued a brutal police campaign in
                                                          
8 In 1956, for example, 87% of the people employed in Kosovo by the secret service and 69% of those
employed by the police forces were Serbs and Montenegrins, although they were less that 20% of the
population. These figures were given in Serbia weekly Interview, date 04.09.1987, (quoted in Horvat,
1988: 62).
9 Some of the major changes included the establishment of a University in Albanian language in Pristina
(1970), permission to use Albanian flag publicly, and increasing representation of the Kosovar Albanians
in public life (see Vickers, 1998: 162-163).
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Kosovo, and second demonstrations of the Albanians in Kosovo and western Macedonia
in 1968.
   However, Albanians were not satisfied with their status, whereas although they
represented the third biggest ethnic group they were granted the status of “nationality,”
which was a constitutional term used for national/ethnic minorities. Aware of this fact,
the Yugoslav Communist leadership, under Tito, granted to Kosovo a high level of
political autonomy with the new constitution adopted in 1974. In fact, this movement
marked perhaps the last attempt undertaken by Tito to balance the conflicting national
aspirations of different Yugoslav groups (especially Serbs, Croats and Albanians). It
created a semi-confederal system in which the decision-making at the center was
depended on consensus between the political leaders of the republics and provinces
(Cohen, 1995: 33). Although the constitution of 1974 did not go far enough to satisfy the
Albanian demands for a republic, and hence theoretical statehood, it granted a very high
level of autonomy for Kosovo. With this constitution Kosovo became a constitutive
element of the federation, with direct and equitable representation in all its party and
state bodies.10
    Advancement of the statues of Kosovo, however, was not acceptable for the Serbs
who began to fear from “Albanization.” Their feeling of insecurity was nurtured by
additional factors, such as the relaxation of the restrictions in communication between
Kosovo and Albania, the high birth rate among the Albanians, equal use of Serbian and
Albanian languages in public life (Bellamy, 2002: 5). On the other hand, there was a big
disparity in economic development between the Kosovo and northern parts of
                                                          
10 As one of the eight federal unites, Kosovo was represented in federal chamber of the Yugoslav
Assembly, and had the right to propose laws and other legal acts within the competences of the Chamber
of Republics and Provinces. It was also separately represented in the Federal Supreme Court and
Constitutional Court. Provinces had the right to veto in all matters which affected them. They also had
their central institutions, similar with the republics (see Vickers, 1998: 178).
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Yugoslavia and Serbia proper. These factors caused two effects: first was the migration
of many Serbs, especially intellectuals, to more urban cities in Serbia, although this
number is often exaggerated. And second they lead to the eruption of Serbian
nationalism, which perceived the factorization of Albanians in Kosovo as a threat to
their national interests. In this spirit, as early as 1977 a working commission of the
Serbian League of Communists prepared, what became known as, the “Blue Book,”
which demanded control of the judiciary, police force and economic policy be returned
to Belgrade (Vickers, 1998). But it was not only Serbs who were unhappy with the
constitutional arrangements of 1974. So were the Albanians, who did not abandon their
aspirations to achieve the status of a nation/republic within the Yugoslav federation.
    When Tito died, in May 1980, he left the country in the grip of by deep political and
economic problems. Most importantly, the country lost the charismatic, albeit
dictatorial, leader who in a way was personification of socialist Yugoslavia and
everything related to it. In light of what has been said above, it is not surprising that
Kosovo became the major battleground were the very survival of post-Tito Yugoslavia
began to be tested. The first blow to the system came from Pristina University students,
who in March of 1981 took to the streets to protest, initially, against the bad conditions
of living in their dormitories. Later the protests swept to other towns in Kosovo, and
gave voice to political demands, the major one being the request for upgrading Kosovo’s
legal status to that of republic. Although the protests seemed spontaneous and initially
peaceful, brutal police force was used to quell them, military tanks were deployed in the
cities and a police-military curfew was imposed (Bellamy, 2002: 5-6). These riots served
as a pretext for big purges of the Albanian high ranking communist functionaries and
University professors, who were being accused of not adequately responding to
“Albanian counter-revolutionary forces,” while the University of Pristina was labeled as
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the “cradle of nationalism” (Vickers, 1998: 200-2002). The hunting of Albanian
“nationalists” and precarious trials continued throughout the 1980s, whereby in 1983
around 41% of the political prisoners in Yugoslavia were Albanians (Bellamy, 2002: 7).
    These events just infuriated the Serbian discontents with the factorization of
Albanians in Kosovo, and Yugoslavia proper. The fear among ordinary Serbs that
Kosovo “was being Albanized” was exacerbated. Again, the irrational and immoral
perception prevailing among the Serbs that any improvement of the position of
Albanians in Yugoslavia was to their detriment was falsely imbedded by their elite.
Regrettably enough, there were academic circles and religious leaders who took the lead
in a well-orchestrated campaign of demonization of Albanians, thus appealing to the
feeling of victimization inculcated deeply in the Serbian collective memory. Serbian
propaganda began to portray Albanians as rapists, bandits and enemies of the State. In
1948, for example, Atanasije Jevtic, the Orthodox Archimandrite, stated publicly that
“Serbian girls and old women were being raped in the villages and nunneries” (Bellamy,
2002: 7). The falseness of this claim, as Malcolm (1998: 339) argues, was shown by a
detailed study of the incidence of rape in Yugoslavia, carried out in Belgrade. According
to this study Kosovo had the lowest incidence of rape in Yugoslavia, while 71 percent of
rape cases were between the same nationality. Yet the most dramatic appeal “for the bad
position of Serbs in Yugoslavia” was issued by members of Serbian Academy of arts
and Science in 1986. Namely in a famous memorandum, the sixteen prominent members
of this towering intellectual institution in Serbia voiced their accusation about state
policy in Kosovo in following terms (quoted in Anzulovic, 1999: 108): “Not only are the
last remnants of the Serbian people leaving their land, constantly and at one unabated
rate, but…chased by violence and a physical, moral, and psychological terror, they are
preparing for their final exodus.”
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  After warning of war in Kosovo if the state did not take radical measures, the
memorandum called for concrete steps, such as reduction of autonomous status,
detachment of its links with Albania and changing ethnic structure in disfavor of
Albanians (Vickers, 1998: 222). Furthermore, this nationalist manifesto did not only
raise the question of “Albanian threat in Kosovo.” Indeed the main message transmitted
by the memorandum was that there was an anti-Serb conspiracy being carried out by
their neighbors (in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia), who allegedly were plotting their
destruction. Anzulovic (1999: 114) rightly concludes that, by exposing the Serbian
grievances based on distorted data and by providing justification for the use of force, the
memorandum created an ideological platform for the pan-Serbian policy of Slobodan
Milosevic. Indeed, not only the spirit of the memorandum was to become the guide of
Serbian aggressive policy throughout the 1990s, but some of its most important
architects were later to play an active political role in Serbia.11 It was this political
mindset prevailing among the Serbian intellectuals and, regrettably, religious circles that
gave the main socio-cultural thrust to the emergence of “Milosevic phenomenon”, with
other factors playing a supplementary role. Neglecting this crucial fact, which is a
general tendency among Western policy-makers, is not detrimental only to the long-term
stability of the region, but it decisively obstructs the Serbian long path to a democratic
society.
                                                          
11 For example the prominent writer Dobrica Cosic,  who was the main architect of the memorandum and
the head of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science, was elected as President of rump Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992.
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2.5  Failure of the second Yugoslavia experiment and the question of Kosovo
History tells us that, as a general rule, great events are almost never the product of a
single causal factor. This was amply demonstrated, as stated above, when the first
Yugoslav state was created (during the first half of the twentieth century), and this
lesson was repeated when the South Slavic state violently disintegrated at the closing
decade of the same century. Factors leading too the dissolution of Yugoslavia are to
complex to be elaborated in this work. In general terms, there was again an overlap of
international political and economic changes with the internal dynamics that lead to such
a dramatic end of the second Yugoslav experiment.
    The first serious signs of crisis in the Yugoslav system were heralded by the end of
the 1970s, following changes in international economy caused by the higher costs of
energy, oil technology and capital. By the beginning of the 1980s, Yugoslav economy
was rocked by enormous inflation, high unemployment, a huge foreign debt and serious
food shortages (Cohen, 1995: 37). When in the context of worldwide concerns about,
The International Monitory Fond asked for reckoning of the debts of Third World
countries, discovery of the high scale Yugoslav indebtedness resulted in a serious
political shock (Allcock, 2000: 426). This event exacerbated contradictory debates
between the Federal center and republics/provinces, and among the latter. The growing
gap in the economic development between the north and south, and the fact that
international credits were managed largely independently by regional centers, just fueled
discontent. While the need for reforms became pressing, the powerful political elites at
the republican/provincial level could not agree about future steps needed in this
direction. The old-persisting conflict between centralist versus decentralist tendencies,
30
curtailed skillfully by Tito, came into fore again. Thus, by the middle of the 1980s,
economic recession began to leave space to ethnic nationalism, which, as latter
developments demonstrated, always waited for its chance.
    With the end of the Cold War, and changing of security parameters, Yugoslavia lost
the last, and perhaps the most powerful, trump of its existence. The balance of fear
wrapping up the Cold War period rendered unthinkable the forceful alteration of state
frontiers, whether within the spheres of influence of two rival super-powers (e.g. Eastern
Europe), or at the spots where the interests of the two blocks clashed (e.g. Korean War
of 1950). On the other hand, ever since Tito broke with Stalin (1948), resulting in
Yugoslav withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and following introduction of a more
“liberal socialism,” Yugoslavia was seen in the West as an important example of the
“anti-Soviet rebellion” within the Socialist camp. However, although the Soviet threat,
with the Czechoslovak scenario for example, was always seriously perceived by the
Yugoslav political establishment, Moscow was careful no to alienate Yugoslavia to such
an extent as to throw it fully upon Western arms. This position of “power between
superpowers,” as Spencer portrays it (in Spencer et al. 2000: 12), enabled Tito to secure
benefits from both sides, while strengthening internal cohesion. With the fading away of
the Cold War security paradigms, international pressure for keeping the frontiers frozen
withered, while the penetration of democratic political changes allowed different groups
to openly express their conflicting interests and ambitions.
    In the Yugoslav case, decline of the communist system not only opened the way for
nationalist forces to become legitimate political players, but it also lead to the
conversion of a large portion of the communist political elite into nationalism. Some
authors have attributed this fact either to the similarities between communism and
nationalism, whereas in both of them an imaginary enemy played an important role for
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mobilization, either for class or national struggles, or to the democratic deficit in the
Yugoslav system. In explaining the transformation of the Yugoslav political elite from
communist to nationalism, Zarko Puhovski pointed out that “people hardly knew how to
react when there was no an enemy to struggle against. After the Cold War the class
struggle become unpopular, but the former communists needed a substitute enemy
whose members could be identified almost at sight. Such group identification was most
readily found in ethnicity…” (quoted in Spencer  et al. 2000: 12). These hypotheses
have some explanatory force. What they cannot explain, however, is why some other
communist countries took the opposite path (e.g. Hungary), and, most importantly, why
the adoption of nationalist agenda in Yugoslavia led to such a ferocious end.
2.5.1 Milosevic, war and NATO intervention
    In a cable to the US Secretary of State James Baker, Warren Zimmerman –the US
ambassador to Belgrade during the last days of Yugoslavia’s life, wrote (quoted in
Belmar, 2004): “I have no doubt that if Milosevic’s parents had committed suicide
before his birth rather than after, I would not be writing a cable about the death of
Yugoslavia. Milosevic, more than anything else, is its gravedigger.” While the debates
about the reasons for dissolution of Yugoslavia continue, it is overwhelmingly accepted
that the “Milosevic factor,” was the major cause of the violence characterizing this
process. Yet, it is often said that Milosevic was never a loyal nationalist, nor a
communist transformed into a nationalist, but his political motivations and visions were
primarily shaped by his lust for power. Accordingly, it is a misleading
oversimplification to solely blame him for the violent behavior of the Serbs during the
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course of Yugoslav nightmare. Indeed, Milosevic was just an aggressive voice of the
particular patterns of nationalist ideology prevailing among the Serbian elite, and of the
political culture resulting therefrom. Dobrica Cosic, who is often called the father of
Serbian nation in present times, has faithfully demonstrated this hypothesis. He, on one
occasion, described Milosevic in following terms (quoted in Judah, 2000: 47-48):
     Milosevic was devoting himself bravely to the renewal of the Serbian state
     and the salvation of the Serbian people from new slavery and annihilation
     ….Slobodan  Milosevic has done for the Serbian people more than all
    Serbian politicians in the last decade.
Milosevic rose to power by promising to the Serbs in Fushe Kosova (the site of the
famous Battle) that he “was the new Kosovo hero who will protect them.” Ironically,
Serbs who controlled the army and security apparatus all over Yugoslavia, let alone
Kosovo, were complaining that they were being abused by the Albanians. A turning
point was his visit (then a chairman of the Serbian League of Communists) to Kosovo,
on April 24, 1987, where he was supposed to participate in a meeting of the Provincial
Communist Party in Fushe Kosova. Clashes broke out between the local police and
some 15.000 Serbs, who were gathering outside the building where the meeting was
taking place. Addressing the mass of angry Serb protesters, he uttered his famous words
“no one should dare to beat you anymore” and proceeded to give a speech about the
“historic injustices” and “sacred rights” of the Serbs (Thomas, 1999: 44-45).  With
support of the media, and mass rallies through the country known as “meetings of truth”
he was able to mobilize large popular segments, which enabled him first to defeat his
opponents inside Serbia’s League of Communists, and consequently to force into
resignation the governments of Vojvodina and Montenegro (see for more details
Thomas: 1999: 44-45). Commenting on this campaign, whose proclaimed aim was
“unification of Serbia,” leading Serbian newspaper Politika triumphantly stated that “no
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force can now stop the Serbian unification” (Malcolm, 1998: 229). The archaic rhetoric
and symbolism displayed in the “meetings of truth,” which were held throughout
Serbian inhabited territories of former Yugoslavia, was a clear warning of the poisoning
atmosphere dominating the Serbian political life. Even the ancient remains of Prince
Lazar were used to galvanize national romantic feelings, as the coffin with its remains
was sent from one Serbian village to another for a whole year. At each stop, as Spencer
(in Spencer et al. 2000: 14) describes, people reacted as if Lazar had been killed only the
day before. The mass rally held at the site of the Kosovo Battle of 1389, on the 600th
anniversary of that event, marked the resumption of the first Milosevic’s crusade. In this
meeting, which took place after the forceful revocations of Kosovo’s autonomous status
(to be discussed below), and was attended by some 500,000 Serbs, high ranking Serbian
politicians and intellectuals as well as Serbian Orthodox clergy, Milosevic, whose
pictures together with the Prince Lazar’s portraits dominated the scene, utterly declared
that “six hundred years later we are again involved in the battles, and facing battles.
They are not battles with arms, but they cannot be excluded…” (Thomas, 1999: 50). The
slogans such as “we seek nothing new-only the empire of Dusan”12, or “if necessary will
fight for freedom” (Thomas, 1999), were indeed a prologue to the bloody adventure in
which Milosevic was leading his people. Thus, the cancer that killed Yugoslavia, as Tim
Judah (2000: 33) metaphorically observes, began in Kosovo. The Kosovars, therefore,
became the first to experience the tragedy of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, and feel
the brutality of Milosevic’s camping to protect the “sacred” Serbian interests.
                                                          
12 Stefan Dusan  “The Mighty” (1331-55) was a most successful ruler of the Serbian Medieval state, under
whose reign Serbia expanded southwards taking territories from the Byzantines in Greece, Macedonia and
Albania (Thomas, 1999: 12).
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2.5.2   Abolition of the Kosovo’s autonomy, state apartheid and Albanian reaction
The crucial momentum that was characterized as the beginning of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration drama was the arbitrary change of the constitution of 1974,13 resulting in
revocation of the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This step had a very
negative reflection not only upon Kosovar Albanians, but also for the other Yugoslav
Republics. By this move Milosevic strengthened Serbian position in the federation,
acquiring 4 votes (including Montenegro) in the Yugoslav collective presidency. Other
republics regarded this as a prelude to a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. This act had a
very negative impact in Kosovo. It diminished the fragile balance that was created by
this constitution between the Albanian aspiration for republic inside Yugoslavia and
Serbian tendencies for full control over Kosovo.
     The revocation of the Kosovo’s autonomy was followed by repressive and
discriminatory policy. Almost every aspect of life in Kosovo was affected. In reality,
what was happening in Kosovo in a way was just “a back to the future”, or a repetition
of history in another context.  Not just the aims but also the methods practiced by the
Serbian state greatly resembled those practiced in 1912-13, 1915-1916, 1945-1966, and
propagated by the Serbian Academic Vasa Cubrilovic in 1937. Namely, in pursuing the
final objective of changing the ethnic balance in Kosovo, which was the major Serbian
obsession ever since 1912-1913, the latter engaged in a brutal oppressive policy against
the Albanians, with the aim of rendering their conditions of life intolerable. This policy
was manifested with mass dismissal of Albanian workers from their working places,
                                                          
13 On  23 March 1989 Kosovo’s Communist Assembly was forced under the pressure of police and army
tanks, which had being deployed in Pristina, to vote in favor of the constitutional changes, revoking the
Kosovo’s autonomous statues granted under the 1974 constitution.
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including public services, state enterprises and hospitals. A new school curricula was
introduced, which largely eliminated the teaching of Albanian literature and history, and
subsequently schoolteachers, university professors and students after having refused to
comply with it, were expelled from their schools. Above all, these measures were
conducted with widespread human rights abuses; arbitrary arrests, torture and detention
without trial (see Malcolm, 1998: 348-350).
   The reaction among the Kosovar Albanians was immediate and intense. Many public
demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of protests took place, resulting in clashes with
police, which left dozens of Albanians killed. At the political level, the major reaction
toward constitutional changes took place on July 2, 1990. Three days before the Kosovo
Assembly was dissolved, 114 of the 123 Albanian delegates met on the steps of the
Assembly’s building. They adopted a declaration giving the Albanians a status of a
nation entitled to their own Republic. Another meeting of now dissolved Assembly, on
September 7, 1990, adopted the “constitutional law of the Republic of Kosovo.” In
September 1991, a self-organized referendum on independence of Kosovo took place,
and in May 1992 Kosovo wide elections were held. In the referendum, which was
proclaimed illegal by the Serbian regime, the overwhelming majority of the population
voted for independence of Kosovo (Judah, 200: 64-66).
2.5.3 Pacifists and warriors:  from non-violence to Kosovo Liberation Army
In light of the Serbian strategy of strong-hand rule over Kosovo and the Albanian
political mobilization in counteraction, there was a general feeling, whether within
Kosovo or abroad, that Kosovo was at the edge of the war. But two developments
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changed the course of events. First, failure of the leaders of the six Yugoslav republics to
find a compromise about the future of a common state (in 1990), clearly heralded the
unknown and dangerous direction in which the South Slavic state was heading. By the
end of 1990 and beginning of 1991 situation took dramatic path, as the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA),14 acting on behalf of the Serbs, mowed to the north to end
secessions of Slovenia and Croatia, proclaimed on 25 June 1991. Yet, when the fighting
first broke out in 1991 few people seemed to be thinking that this event marked the
beginning of a long conflict that for almost a decade would hassle the international
community so deeply, causing serious fractures and, ultimately, leading to radical
regional geopolitical changes. Moreover, even the most portentous observers would not
have believed that the unfolding Yugoslav crisis, especially the Bosnia nightmare, would
bring into the homes of Europeans (who were gripped by the enthusiasm of the rising
new, post-Communist, era based on moral rectitude) images seen only in Holocaust and
Auschwitz.
    Second, and perhaps the most important obstacle to war in Kosovo was adoption of a
non-violent and passive form of resistance by the Kosovar Albanians. Lead by a web of
newly created political parties, especially the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK in
Albanian), NGOs and other civic groups, Albanians developed parallel institutions (not-
recognized officially by Serbia), in education, health, sports, information and culture.15
This strategy was based on the renouncement of the legitimacy of Serbian rule, although
                                                          
14 JNA is acronym of the Yugoslav Peoples Army in the Serbo-Croatian language.
15 The shadow society/state, as observers usually tend to portray it, functioned thanks to the wide social
solidarity, especially among the huge Kosovar diaspora in the West, who regularly paid 3% of their
incomes for this purpose. Activities in education were the major feature of the “parallel society” in
Kosovo. As the teaching in Albanian in high schools as well as University was stopped, Albanians
organized private schools, in homes, restaurants and other private premises donated for this purpose by the
citizens. This education obviously was not recognized officially, and even was obstructed, by the Serbian
state. Overall the “parallel society” was financed by voluntary contributions of Albanians living abroad
and in Kosovo proper. It was channeled by a network of institutions, including the Kosovar shadow
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this was not manifested by any form of massive civil disobedience, and restrain from
embracing a violent means vis-à-vis the Serbian oppressive policy. It was aimed
primarily at attracting international attention to the Kosovo problem, while preserving
the national substance of Albanians by not giving an excuse to the Serbs to commit a
massive ethnic cleansing (as they were doing in Bosnia). The non-violent strategy was
greatly influenced by the events in Croatia and Bosnia, were the massacres by
paramilitary and regular army forces made it apparent what fate Kosovar Albanians
would face if they took up arms against well-organized Serbian forces (Clark, 2002).
Most importantly, this strategy offered an alternative to violent conflicts, which became
the stamp of Yugoslav dismemberment process. It also offered a possibility to those
international mechanisms and powers engaged in finding solution to the Yugoslav
problem, to develop a preventive strategy.
    By the mid-1990s, Kosovar Albanians began to “lose patience” with the lack of
results from the non-violent strategy. The problem of Kosovo on the international
agenda was largely marginalized or, at best, reduced to the question of human rights and
national minority status, while the repression against the Albanians was a permanent
feature of their daily life. 16 Subsequently the Democratic League of Kosovo, which was
the engine of the non-violent policy, began to be criticized. The criticism to this policy
emerged whether from within, for adoption of extensively passive strategy, or from
outside, for its maximalist demands (nothing less than independence). It is
overwhelmingly accepted that the Dayton Agreement (1995), which ended the war in
                                                                                                                                                                          
Presidency, Government in exile (Germany), financial councils (operating with the money collected) and
so forth (for more information about this issue see Howard, 2000).
16 A report issued by Amnesty International in 1994, for example, informed that “the police use violence
with impunity on a daily basis. The Report continued by stating that “thousands of ethnic Albanians have
witnessed police violence or experience it at first hand.” Further Amnesty International reported that
“Police officers express their ethnic hatred towards their victims. A particular savage instance involved a
police officer slashing a Serbian symbol on the chest of an 18-year old ethnic Albanian”. Other incidents
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a great impact in setting the blaze of conflict in Kosovo.
Dayton transmitted very negative messages to the Albanians. Due to the fact that the
problem of Kosovo was completely ignored, Albanians started to believe that
international attention could be attracted only by means of war. The Dayton Agreement
to a large extent legalized the ethno-political realities created by the war and ethnic
cleansing. The Republica Srpska, the phantom Serbian entity in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which was a product of genocide against the Muslims, was granted a high
level of sovereignty, while the international community began to view Milosevic as a
key figure for maintaining the fragile peace yielded by Dayton. Kosovar Albanians were
further frustrated by the recognition of the new Yugoslavia by the EU countries in April
1996.17
   During this period, peace in Kosovo began to be challenged by armed attacks against
the Serbian state targets. Although such attacks were committed even prior to 1996, it
was during this year that the Organization called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
claimed responsibility. Almost at the same time students of the University of Pristina
started to protest demanding the release of the University premises (which were closed
for education in Albanian language). Escalation of armed conflict overshadowed the
student protests, which initially enjoyed strong support among the Albanians population.
Thus, the first armed combats took place in the Drenica region (central part of Kosovo),
where the KLA began to confront openly the Serbian police and military forces. The
events that followed heralded the “new Bosnia.” Serbian forces, aiming to intimidate the
Albanian population, reacted cruelly against the civilians after every armed combat with
                                                                                                                                                                          
mentioned in this report involved murder of six-year-old boy by the police and severe beating of a 90-
year-old man, in one of their daily raids on a Kosovar Albanian homes” (quoted in Bellamy, 2002: 511).
17 The United States, however, while recognizing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, insisted on
maintaining of the so-called “outer wall of sanctions” against the FRY because of the situation in Kosovo
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 21-25).
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the KLA. In one such action, in reaction for the killing of four Serbian police officers,
Serbian forces launched an attack in two villages, leaving 26 civilians dead. Few days
latter, on March 5, 1999, Serbian armed forces attacked the Jashari family, which were
considered as key players in the local growth of the KLA in the Drenica region. Using
artillery against the homes and sharp shooters against those who fled, the massacre left
58 dead, including Adem Jashari, one of the most famous KLA local commanders, and
created a martyr for the KLA cause  (Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
2000). These massacres did not have the effect intended by the Serbian authorities, as
Albanians were not intimidated. Quite the opposite, a great excitement had seized them,
and they massively began to join KLA’s ranks. Hence, at the beginning 1998 it became
obvious that the long announced war in Kosovo, or explosion of the “powder keg” was a
reality. International community failed in developing a preventive strategy even though
the Albanian peaceful movement offered a chance to it.
2.5.4 International response: from force of diplomacy to diplomacy of force
The Yugoslav crisis coincided with the beginning of a new epoch in the international
realm, characterized by radical transformations resulting from ending of the world
bipolar system. As such, not only that Yugoslav crisis was one of the major challenges
for the new international order, which was supposed to be built upon liberal values and
international institutions, but the direction of this crisis was largely influenced by the
international reaction to it. This reciprocal influence is a complex and wide issue and as
such it merits more space and effort than the scope of this work can offer. The
international response to the Kosovo problem changed inconsistently throughout the
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1990s, thus reflecting not just dynamics on the ground, but primarily the lack of a
coherent approach on the part of the international community towards the Yugoslav
problem as a whole.
    In the beginning of 1990s, not just Kosovo but also the dramatic situation taking place
in the northern part of former Yugoslavia was greatly overshadowed by the profound
transformations at the global level. International political agenda at that time was
dominated by events in Middle East following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, German
reunification and fear about its possible implications, uncertainty about the path of the
Soviet Union’s transition/dissolution, and advancement of the EC integration in a new
context. It was this complex environment, and perhaps the fear that stemmed from the
historically inherited lesson that Balkan troubles are prone to produce very bad
international consequences, that initially lead the Europeans and Americans to hope
naively that the Yugoslav state, with whatever arrangements, would continue to exist
(Danchev, Halverson et al.  1996: 4-6). Yet, as the war flames not only reduced but also
went further by gripping Bosnia (1992) into a horrible bloodshed, it became clear that
Yugoslavia was going towards an irreversible and violent disintegration path.
Consequently, the Yugoslav problem assumed a central place on the international
political agenda. Thus, after the initial dominant EU role, other international
mechanisms, such as UN, NATO, OSCE, Contact Group18, G-819, became altogether
voice of the international community, although, as Albercht Schnabel rightly observes,
“as throughout the turbulent history of the Balkans, it was again in large part the major
                                                          
18 The Contact Group, which assumed a central role in formulating international response to the Yugoslav
crises, was created by the UN in April 1994. It consisted of France, Italy, Germany, United States, United
Kingdom and Russia.
19 The G-8 played crucial a role in the political process that lead to the stopping of NATO’s war against
Yugoslavia (to be discussed in chapter 3). It consists of the members of Contact group plus Japan and
Canada.
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European powers and US who finally determined the future of the region” (quoted in
Spillmann et al. 2000: 24).
 Although the Kosovo problem was at the fore of the Yugoslav crisis ever since1989, it
was largely ignored prior to 1998. Indeed this problem was sidelined by developments in
Bosnia and Croatia, and by the inclination of international actors to qualify it as a human
rights problem, not as a conflict originating from the competing claims of Serbs and
Albanians over territory. This qualification of the problem, which reflected the
overwhelming international view that Kosovo was an internal matter of Serbia (while
the latter was held responsible only for not upholding individual human rights and
minority standards), lead to the exclusion of Kosovo from international diplomatic
efforts to solve the Yugoslav dissolution crises. Virtually, Kosovar Albanians did not
participate as equal partners in any international diplomatic initiative related to the
Yugoslav conflict prior to 1999 (Rambouillet conference). They were not invited to the
Hague conference of 1991, they were neglected by the so-called Badinter Arbitration
Commission20, and participated only as passive spectators in the London conference of
1992 (Bellamy, 2002:  29-31). Most importantly the Badinter Commission held the
“professional view” that only the Yugoslav republics were entitled to the right to self-
determination and secession, as they were “the bearers of the Yugoslav sovereignty.”21
Overall, the international community failed to develop a preventive strategy. The
philosophy of dealing only with the crises that had degenerated into armed conflicts
                                                          
20 The Badinter Commission, the name given after the French lawyer Robert Badinter who was the head of
the commission, was established as an arbitration body where the “relevant authorities had to submit their
differences.”       
21 By the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992 this Commission issued two landmark opinions for the future
of former Yugoslavia; first it declared that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in the process
of dissolution; and second opinion was related to the right to self-determination, whereby the commission
noted that the right to self-determination must not involve the changes of “existing frontiers.” It also
mentioned the obligation of the states, stemming from international law, to uphold the rights of minorities.
Most importantly, only the republics were granted the right to self-determination, while it was denied to
the provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina (see Bellamy, 2002: 22-29).
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delegitimized other options in the eyes of Albanians, and Dayton was a clear indicator of
that.22
    And Albanians were not mistaken in their perception. As the first armed clashes took
place, international actors put the situation in Kosovo high on the political agenda. On
24th of September 1997, for the first time after eruption of armed conflict, the Contact
Group voiced its concern about the situation in Kosovo and issued an appeal for
negotiations. The Belgrade regime, however, declared that Kosovo was a Serbian
internal affair and rejected the proposal for dialogue. On March 9, 1998, the Contact
Group met to review the new developments, and decided unanimously to impose an
arms embargo and a ban on transfer of equipment that could be used for repression
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 28).  This statement served as
a foundation for the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) Resolution 1160 (March 31, 1998).
This resolution represented the first UN reaction to the escalation of armed conflict in
Kosovo. It imposed an arms embargo and called for a real dialogue between the
conflicting parties. In the face of increasing fighting and displacement of tens of the
thousands of people and killings of many civilians, NATO increased its military
presence in neighboring Macedonia and Albania and started to threaten Belgrade with
air strikes. It was not until the October 1998, however, that NATO issued an “Activation
Order” for a military air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As the
situation continued to deteriorate, UN adopted resolution 1199 (in September 23, 1998),
expressing concern for an “impending humanitarian catastrophe,” caused by the
displacement of nearly 230.000 Kosovars from their homes. The most significant
                                                          
22 One particular development during 1992, however, seems to have indicated that Kosovo was not
considered by all international actors as an internal problem, and it transcended the limits of human rights
issue. On Christmas day of 1992, the US President George Bush warned Milosevic that, “in the event of
conflict in Kosovo caused by the Serbian action the US will be prepared to employ the military force
against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper” (Bellamy, 2002:  34).
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importance of this resolution was the fact that it classified deterioration of the situation
in Kosovo as a “threat to the peace and security in the region,” thereby setting the stage
for possible future military action.23  But, despite the seemingly convergent policies
among the permanent members of the Security Council, significantly divergent
interpretations of the above resolution followed. Thus, while Russia stated that
regardless of the reference to Chapter VII, no use of force was contemplated by the
UNSC Resolutions, the US took a different stance announcing that NATO was planing
military operation to guarantee, if necessary, compliance with the Resolutions (Gazzini,
2001: 405).  By making clear that they would use a veto without proposing any
productive alternative (Rytter, 2002: 151), Russia and China encouraged an outcome
that would inevitably weaken the role of the UNSC and contribute to NATO’s action.
    Coercive diplomacy began to show results when, under the threat of NATO air
strikes, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevoc reached an agreement with the US
envoy Richard Holbrook, on 12 October 1998, which obliged Serbia to partially
withdraw its military forces from Kosovo. Deployment of an OSCE verification mission,
called The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), consisting of 2.000 unarmed personnel,
and NATO overflight mission, were also part of this agreement. The agreement was
endorsed by the UNSC Resolution 1203, on October 24, 1998. However, the initial
progress brought by the deployment of the OSCE unarmed personnel was short-lived.
The situation changed rapidly with the Recak massacre, one of the most terrible
massacres seen during the bloody wars in former Yugoslavia.24 This event proved once
again that Milosevic was planning to continue with his policy of massacres and ethnic
cleansing, ignoring therefore all international warnings, let alone any moral principle. In
                                                          
23 These resolutions can be reached at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html.
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response, the Contact Group made the last attempt to give a chance to the peaceful
solution of the conflict by organizing, in February 1999, direct negotiations between the
Serb and Albanian representatives in the French castle Rambouillet. After six weeks,
negotiations ended without agreement. Indeed the Albanian delegation, with occasional
hesitations from the KLA representatives, had signed a document agreeing for an interim
process of international administration, upholding the formal Yugoslav sovereignty over
Kosovo, deployment of the NATO troops on the ground for the maintenance of the
peace process, and finally organization after three years of an international conference
for the determination of the final status of Kosovo, where the “will of the people” and
the “opinions of the relevant authorities” would be taken into consideration. Serbian
representatives, however, refused to sign this agreement (Schwartz, 2000).
     By this time, NATO’s credibility was at stake perhaps more than ever before. Had
Belgrade been tolerated to continue to disregard the Alliance’s warnings (as it was doing
for almost a decade with the UNSC resolutions), the new image that NATO was creating
in the post-Cold War era would have been seriously damaged. Beyond this aspect, it was
generally accepted that the possibility for the spillover of the conflict into the Kosovo
neighborhood (particularly to Albania and Macedonia), was a very possible and
dangerous scenario. Additionally, failure to prevent the genocide in Bosnia served as a
warning bell into the conscience of western leaders, as similar tragedy was already
unfolding in Kosovo. This situation exposed the international community, particularly
NATO states, to the puzzle of choosing between the legal or moral and political
imperatives. Finally, the moral and political arguments outweighed the dogmatic legal
considerations, and on 24 March 1999 NATO launched a military campaign, called
                                                                                                                                                                          
24 The atrocity at Recak occurred on January 15, 1999. Serb forces entered into the village and massacred
forty-five persons, mainly civilians. This massacre was classified as a crime against humanity by the head
of KVM, the US diplomat William Walker, who directly accused Serbian forces (Schwartz, 2000: 141).
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“Allied Force”, against the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) that lasted for 78 days and
resulted in putting an end to the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing and genocide against
Kosovar Albanians (see Henkin, 1999; Wedgwood, 1999). In response to this
intervention, Serbs reacted swiftly by activating, what seemed to be, an already existing
plan called “Horse Shoe.” This plan resulted in a wholesale deportation of over eight
thousand Albanians, killing more than ten thousand, burning and looting entire villages
and dwellings (American Journal of International Law, 1999: 5-32).
    The military intervention ended in June 11, 1999, the day after Yugoslav authorities
accepted an agreement allowing full international control over Kosovo, while the
Yugoslav forces withdrew totally (to be discussed in the following chapter). Perhaps
more fundamentally than any recent international occurrence, NATO intervention on
behalf of the Kosovars has provoked extremely contradictory interpretations about what
is and what should be the hierarchical pyramid of international norms and values in the
new “global order”. More accurately, NATO’s intervention against a sovereign state
without an explicit mandate of the UNSC brought into the surface once again the long
existing controversies about the legality and legitimacy of the use of force for solely
humanitarian purposes. It also highlighted the different perceptions on international law
between the powerful states, reflecting primarily their sociopolitical and cultural fabric.
Discussing the dimensions of the NATO intervention in Kosovo is beyond the scope of
this work. Overall, although the legality of this action remains controversial, owing to
the different interpretations of the vague international law principles, it is widely
accepted that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was strongly legitimate from the political
and moral perspective.
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CHAPTER 3
TESTING THE NEW SOLUTIONS: PEACE-BUILDING,
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE KOSOVO
CONFLICT
The previous chapter clearly underlines that the dispute over Kosovo between Serbs and
Albanians posses all the features to be qualified as an intractable and long-lasting ethnic
conflict, perhaps with a few comparisons in the Balkans or beyond. As such, it certainly
represents a difficult and highly challenging task for those outside forces attempting to
change the traditional image of the Balkans, by putting a final lid on the histories of
conflicts and crises, which for centuries have been a metaphor of this region. NATO
intervention and its aftermath marked a radical shift in terms of international
involvement, while bringing profound changes to Kosovo and its neighborhood. Not just
because it showed to the conflict-prone forces of the region, and elsewhere, “the
muscles” of the liberal world, but also because it made Kosovo a terrain for testing new
international approaches to conflict management and resolution, developed by the UN
and other international forces in the aftermath of the Cold War.
    In fact as East-West rivalries came to an end by the closing decade of the 20th century,
the number of ethnic and other intrastate conflicts it helped to curb came to an end as
well. In turn, international security mechanisms, primarily the United Nations,
responded by engineering a new type of conflict management/resolution techniques
whereby the concept of peace operations (or sometimes refereed to as peacekeeping)
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experienced a revolutionary transformation. Consequently, the concept of peace-
building or nation-building (the meaning of these terms is explained below), constructed
upon the premises of liberal capitalist ideology, became a term depicting new directions
in peace operations. The relatively short experience with this new experiment does not
allow us to make any final statement about its effectiveness, although this has become a
very hot issue in light of the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Surely,
the present international operation in Kosovo is one of the largest endeavors in peace-
building, and as such it represents an important test for the propositions upon which this
concept is constructed. Furthermore, the current international mission in Kosovo,
respectively the operational framework upon which peace-building is implemented, is
unique and unprecedented many aspects. This chapter shall highlight major aspects of
the international administration in Kosovo. Yet before dwelling on the analysis of the
Kosovo case, from the perspective of peace-building missions, this chapter initially shall
discern the general picture of peace-building, from the conceptual and historical
perspective. Having elaborated this issue, it continues by analyzing the overall political
and legal aspects of the current international administration in Kosovo.
3.1 Evolution of the concept and practice of peace-building: some general
       observations
    The term peace-building is relatively new although the phenomenon it aims to
describe is older. This concept is neither clearly defined nor consistently used. This, at
least partially, is a reflection of the fact that most academic and other work related to this
issue was rather descriptive, focusing on elaboration of cases where peace-building was
supposed to take place. On the other hand, in debating the same matter different authors
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use the substitute term “nation-building”, or, more rarely, “state-building/making”25 or
“institution-building.”26 The term peace-building, which is very broadly used, is
affiliated with the new (second) generation of peace operations, the so-called
multidimensional missions, launched or authorized by the United Nations in the post-
Cold War era.27 In this context, the term peace-building was firstly employed and
defined by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in “An Agenda for Peace,”
in 1992 (Pugh. 1995: 321). Ghali’s delineation of peace-building as an “action to
identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order
to avoid a relapse into the conflict,”28 remains the most cited definition of this concept.
    On the other hand, in describing the same issue different observers use the term
nation-building. There have been different interpretations as to what exactly this term
denotes. This concept can very well be viewed in historical context, describing the
processes of creation of nations and nation-states. Along this lines, Amitai Etzioni
(2004) makes the distinction between purposive and natural societal changes affiliated
with nation-building, and observes that nation-building took place in earlier generations
as a revolt against foreign imperial rule. The latter perspective, apparently, is out of the
focus of this work. Within the ambit of international peace and security studies, the term
                                                          
25 At the conceptual level, Keith Jaggers describes State-building/making as a “states ability to accumulate
power” (quoted in Ayoob, 1995: 21). In the context of peace operations, this concept is directly linked
with the international response to state failure. The latter meaning of this concept is explored by Tonya
Langford (1999).
26 In his work “U.N. engagement in Ethnic Conflicts”, David J. Scheffer (quoted in Wippman et al. 1998:
147-177) asserts that institution-building is one of the goals of UN’s engagement in ethnic conflicts. This
concept, according to him, describes a process of “assisting in limited ways with the building of the
existing or new nations that arise from the containment or resolution of an ethnic conflict.”
27 Traditionally peacekeeping missions were characterized as non-combat military operations launched  or
authorized by the UN, with the consent of conflicting parties, with the aim of preserving  peace (mostly
through monitoring ceasefire agreements), but with very limited political objectives. The new,
“multidimensional” peace operation, on the other hand, are ascribed more ambitious sociopolitical,
economic and other objectives, and hence broader mandates, while they became more inclusive in terms
regional organizations involvement. They are also characterized by a broader mandate of peacekeepers to
use force (see Malone and Wermester, 2000; Durch, 1990:  1 – 10; Fetherston, 1994: 20-42).
28 “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping”, can be reached at:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/una/950306054234.htm, (lastly consulted on 26.04.2005).
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nation-building is often affiliated with Third World dynamics, or with the international
response to failed states. According to Dennis Jett (1999: 20), for example, the term
“nation-building” was first applied in Latin America during the Cold War, and ever
since it began to be used more broadly to refer to the strengthening of institutions
through the Third World.
   Differences are more visible when it comes to describing as to what nation-building
process involves. Some observers go as far as to believe that nation-building is nothing
less than forging a new nation. Along these lines, Amitai Etzioni (2004: 2-3) gives a
general definition of nation-building as a process embracing three interrelated
dimensions; unification of disparate ethnic groups, democratization and economic
reconstruction. He points out that the idea is to build a nation, not a state. Others, like
Marina Ottaway (2002: 16-22), bearing in mind that nation-building is a response to
particular situations, underline that “the goal of nation-building missions should not be
to create new identities on deeply divided peoples, but to organize states, or even create
new ones, that can administer their territories and allow people to live together despite
their differences.” The term “nation-building” finds more usage in American
vocabulary. Americans seem to be more inclined to believe in the possibility of creating
new national identities, through transplanting the “western model” of political and
economic organization, which basically is the central part of nation/peace-building
missions. In the words of Francis Fukuyama (2004: 134), “this is reflection of the
American national experience in which cultural and historical identity was heavily
shaped by the political institutions, like constitution and democracy.” While Europeans,
having gone through somewhat different historical experiences in terms of national
identity creation, are more careful in making a distinction between state and nation,
being at the same time fully aware of the non-uniform meaning of the concept of nation.
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Therefore Europeans are prone to believe that nation-building in the sense of creating a
community bound together by shared history and culture is well beyond the ability of
any outside power to achieve (Fukuyama, 2004:  134).
    The terms peace-building and nation-building are used simultaneously to describe the
same phenomena. They both basically denote a process of political, economic and
cultural transformations, undertaken by international agents in a country torn by internal
or external armed conflict, with the aim of creating a new environment more conductive
to peace. The fundamental goal of peace /nation-building exercises is to address the
underlying sociopolitical, economic and cultural roots of the conflict, through
engineering radical transformations. Changes resulting from the peace/nation-building
endeavors are profound and purposive. They, in many cases, involve nothing less than
reshaping traditional norms, values and habits underpinning the political culture in the
targeted country. This phenomenon is usually portrayed as “social engineering” (Etzioni,
2004: 4), as the social changes it produces do not follow the path of social
transformations taking place spontaneously or naturally.
    In light of the above explanations, one can conclude that both terms mentioned above,
whether peace-building or nation-building, can be appropriately employed to depict the
current international mission in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the term peace-building is
preferred through this work. It appears that this notion fits better with the most important
features of the international administration in Kosovo. First, this term has found almost
exclusive usage in the UN lexicon, and the international mission in Kosovo is being
carried out under the UN Security Council’s mandate. Second, although creation of a
new, more civic, political culture is a central challenge of the UN mission in Kosovo,
forging a new national identity, at the expense of ethnic ones, seems to be out of the
question.
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3.1.1 Liberal internationalism, democratic peace and peace-building operations
Eruption of the large number of intra-state conflicts at the closing of the Cold War found
scholars of social sciences engaged in intense debates about the ideological dimensions
of the fall of Berlin Wall. The victory of the Western block, more than anything else,
was seen by many (e.g. Francis Fukuyama in his monumental work The End of History
and the Last Man) as a firm indicator of the uncontested superiority of the liberal
democracy vis-à-vis the totalitarian ideologies.29 Consequently, spread of liberal
democratic norms and institutions started to be perceived as the surest foundation not
only for socioeconomic development, but also for international peace and security.
Emergence of the propositions of “democratic peace theory” as conventional wisdom,
by the beginning of 1990s (Maoz, 1997: 162), was the best expression of this
enthusiasm.
    Any intrusion into debating the causal link between the democracy (or liberal
democracy) and peace can lead to protracted exchange of arguments and counter-
arguments. Obviously this exceeds the limits of this work. However, exploring briefly
this relation, and thus the democratic peace theory is necessary in order to understand
the ideological backdrop of peace-building exercises. In this context, it is by no means
surprising that the term peace-building, and accordingly the missions it pertains to, came
                                                          
29 According to Robert A. Dahl (1996: 639-648) “ a country is said to embrace liberal democracy if it
possesses all the political institutions characteristic of a modern representative government with universal
or near universal suffrage.” In discussing the link between democracy and peace, some other authors, like
John M. Owen (1994: 88), add to the definition of liberal democracy “the leverage of citizens over war
decision.” Totalitarianism, on the other side, signifies “a dictatorial form of centralized government that
regulates every aspect of state and private behavior.” The term was originally intended to designate fascist
and communist regimes. These qualifications are depicted by Iain McLean, (quoted in Oxford Concise
Dictionary of Politics, 1996: 500 – 501).
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to dominate the field of international and peace studies in the 1990s and afterwards.30
Indeed this is just an, usually unnoticed, form of expression of the post-Cold War
ideological trend. Arguably, the idea of externalizing political principles beyond state
frontiers, for the sake of pace, is not new. It was firstly expressed in an articulated form
by Imanuel Kant in his masterpiece The Perpetual Peace. Kant believed that states with
republican constitution-including the legal equality of subjects, representative
government, and separation of powers, would tend to be peaceful with each other (Paris,
1997: 54-89). The democratic peace theory establishes a strong causal link between
democracy and peace. In essence it points out that while states characterized by
democratic political systems are as war prone as other (non-democracies), they rarely (if
ever) engage in war against one another (Gochman et al. 1997: 177-187). This theory (if
its fits the criteria to be qualified as such) has generated a lot of contradictory debates. In
explaining the reason for absence of war between democracies, proponents refer either
to institutional constrains, such as the restraining effect of public opinion and the checks
and balances embedded in the democratic state’s political structure, or to democratic
norms and culture, including shared commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes (see
Layne, 1994: 5-49). Democratic norms and institutions are believed to facilitate the
peaceful accommodation of disputes and conflicts of interests. This assumption is said to
apply whether within democratic states, or in their reciprocal interaction (Farnham,
2003: 395-415; Paris, 1997: 54-89). Critics of the democratic peace proposition, on the
other hand, point out that this theory has serious flaws and hence its plausibility is
questionable. Quite normally, the most flaming criticism comes from the realists who
argue that realpolitik factors, such as power and interests rather than internal processes
                                                          
30 According to William Durch (1996: 3), during the Cold War with the exception of the UN mission in
Congo – ONUC (1960-1964) and the short transitional mission in West Guinea (1962-1963), all other
missions were traditional peacekeeping, including only limited military tasks and objectives.
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and structures, are the main determinants of war and peace (Maoz, 1997: 162; Gochman
et al. 1997: 166). Other scholars attack the democratic peace assumptions using
historical or even cultural arguments. Thus, after referring to particular historical events
where states, which arguably were democratic, engaged in violent conflicts with each
other (e.g. WWII), Faber and Gowa (quoted in Gochman et al. 1997: 177) point out that
if the democratic peace thesis is valid it should apply to the relations among democratic
states regardless of historical period. Along the same lines, John Owen (1994: 88-89)
emphasizes that the democratic peace proposition is ambiguous in terms of how it
defines democracy and war, and goes on by stating that democracies have been at war
with each other several times. Others take a somewhat narrower approach by invoking
cultural arguments. Cohen (quoted in Maoz, 1997: 180), for example, argues that “the
democratic peace result holds true only for the North Atlantic community in the post
WWII era.”
    Regardless of the contradictory debates at the academic level, the idea of
strengthening peace, either within or between states, by promoting democratic
transformations has been the underlying strategy of the majority of peace-building
missions. This fact was recognized even by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to whom, as already
explained, is attributed the authorship of the term peace-building. Thus, writing a year
after “An Agenda for Peace,” Ghali acknowledged that democratic process is an
essential ingredient of peace-building (quoted in Pugh, 1995: 340). The scholars writing
about peace-building seem to agree with this hypothesis. Roland Paris (2001: 36), for
example, observes that “all of the peace-building operations have promoted free and fair
elections, the construction of democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties
and market-oriented economic reforms, or the basic elements of the Western-style
liberal market democracy.”
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3.1.2   Peace-building and “troublesome” countries: a brief historical account of the
           post-WWII era
As already discussed, peace-building operations are not an aim in itself. Rather, they are
conceived primarily as agents of peace and security. This argument is the driving force
behind the advocates and architects of peace-building projects, whether at the UN
headquarter, White House, Brussels or elsewhere. Therefore, it is interesting to see in
which particular situations peace-building exercises are supposed to produce pacification
effects. Historical record demonstrates that generally the peace-building idea was
invented as a mechanism for dealing with the “troublesome” or “trouble-making
countries”; that is defeated or failed states. Although, as explained, this concept is
widely seen as a product of the post-Cold War era, majority of observers agree that the
administration of Western Germany and Japan by the Western allies in the aftermath of
WWII were the two preceding examples in peace-building exercise (Rand Institute,
2003: 15; Durch, 1996: 44). Furthermore, the transformations of Western Germany and
Japan from totalitarian and aggressive states into capitalist democracies in a relatively
short period of time, is convincingly appreciated as the most successful story in the list
of peace-building enterprises. The paramount objective of the Western allies in Germany
and Japan was to prevent the reversion of aggressive behavior of these countries, by
forestalling the resurgence of the totalitarian and war-prone political ideologies and
structures (Rand Institute, 2003: 1-55). The current (2004) international missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter carried out by the Americans in a loose “coalition of the
willing,” but without UN mandate), in some aspects resemble the post-WWII
experiences with Germany and Japan. In all these cases the states in question had to be
militarily defeated and subsequently occupied, they involved change of political regimes
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that were considered illegitimate and dangerous to peace, at least from the perspective of
the outside intervening force. In addition, in all these examples the same outside force
engineered and pursued the process of political, economic and cultural transition of the
targeted countries. Of course this is not to say that there is no difference between these
examples. Indeed the differences are huge and profound, whether in terms of
international political context giving rise to these missions, their legality and legitimacy,
the political, economical and cultural backdrop of the targeted countries and so one. The
German and Japanese examples, on the other hand, added a lot to the controversial
debates on the sociocultural dimension of peace-building projects (to be explored more
in the following sub-chapter).
    For obvious reasons, the peace-building dimension was almost totally absent in most
of the peace operations during the Cold War (with the few exemptions, such as the UN’s
missions in Congo-1960, and Namibia-1978). The very concept of peace operations
developed during this period (traditionally known as peacekeeping), was primarily
utilized to facilitate the smooth functioning of inter-block rivalries, by preventing
antagonistic superpowers from being dragged into many conflicts taking place in the
periphery of their spheres of influence (e.g. Suez-1956,or Congo-1960). In the words of
Inis Claude (quoted in Frydenberg et al. 1964: 81-86), the task of peace operations
during the Cold War was “to make the world safer for the balance of power system, and
the balance of power system safer for the world.” To this end, these operations were
divested from any ideological objective, they were carried out by military personnel, and
non-interference into the internal affaires of the targeted country was considered the
basic principle of these missions.
    The end of the Cold War brought radical changes to the international security
paradigms. Eruption of many intra-state conflicts, of ethnic, tribal, religious or other
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nature, left a myriad of failed and disintegrated states (Langford, 1999). Ultimately, the
countries and regions that for almost half a century had had a very marginal place in the
international security landscape (e.g. Afghanistan, or Somalia) became a major source of
the world’s most serious security problems, starting from terrorism, massive human
rights violations, humanitarian catastrophes, proliferation of the weapons of mass
destruction and so forth. Thus, during the period from the fall of the Berlin Wall to
September 2001, the vast majority of international crisis centered on weak or failing
states, including Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda (Fukuyama, 2004:
125). The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the Unites States, and the link between the al-Qaida
and the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, added another dimension to the security threat
posed by failed states. Therefore, the business of dealing with the failed states has
assumed a central place in the global security agenda. Peace-building became the
preferred option at the hands of international community (UN or regional organizations),
for responding to this challenge. Hence, despite the frustration with the failures in
Somalia, Bosnia or elsewhere, the aftermath of the Cold War witnessed a tremendous
increase in the number of peace-building missions (e.g. Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Sierra
Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan).
    The “social engineering” dimension of these operations varied greatly from one
place to another. In Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, creation of new national
identities is out of the question, as the concept of ethnic nation which prevails in the
Balkans makes this task almost impossible. However, in both these countries the
peace-building missions strive to create a sort of common civic identity, which would
coexist with the various ethnic lines of identification, and would tame their conflicting
tendencies. The electoral system favoring the multiethnic political parties in Bosnia or
invention of the term “Kosovars” to include all ethnic groups in Kosovo serve to this
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purpose. In Haiti, on the other hand, the objective was solely to organize a functional
democratic state, because this country had a relatively consolidated and homogeneous
national identity foundation (Rand Institute, 2003: 71-85). While in places such as
Afghanistan, (or to some extent Somalia) creation of a functional state goes hand in
hand with forging of a common identity at the expense of particularistic tribal or
religious ones (Rand Institute, 2003).
3.1.3  Practical implementation of peace-building: operational strategies,
          facilitating and obstructing factors
In practical terms, the mechanism for reaching the highly ambitious goal of peace-
building in post-conflict countries consists of wide variety of instruments and actions. A
glimpse at the post-Cold War peace-building missions reveals visible differences
between them, in terms of objectives and operational strategies as well as the results they
have produced. The objectives, and hence strategies, of the missions in Kosovo (1999)
and East Timor (2000), for example, were far more ambitious and comprehensive, than,
lets say, in Panama, Grenada or Somalia (see Griffin and Bruce Jones, 1999). The design
of peace-building missions depends on many factors, e.g. the peculiarities of each case,
peace-building agent (UN, regional organization, state or group of states), political
interests of the major powers, and other factors. Yet, despite variations it is possible to
discern an overall operational pattern along which majority of the pace-building
missions developed. These missions take place after violent conflicts finish, and the
conflicting parties agree to a political settlement (e.g., Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia
–1995, or Military Technical Agreement and UNSC Resolution 1244 for Kosovo-1999).
They evolve through different phases, and almost always involve humanitarian
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elements. They embrace a military and a civilian component. The military side of the
mission is in charge of creating and maintaining a safe environment, while the civil
component is responsible for facilitating and managing social, political and economic
transformations, amounting to peace-building (Durch et al. 1996). The central role in
this regard has been attributed to the political pluralism and thus facilitation of free and
fair elections, as a pivotal instrument of democratic processes. Consequently, the design
and management of the election processes has become an important task of the majority
of peace-building missions, staring from Namibia, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
lately Afghanistan and Iraq. Other tasks include building new institutions or
strengthening the existing ones, economic reconstruction and development, instituting
administrative and financial reforms, promoting human rights and rule of law, and
enhancing judicial structures (Wippman et al. 1998).
    The record of the results yielded by the peace-building exercises, which take place in
different spots of the world is mixed. In fact, measuring the successes and failures of
these operations is a broad and controversial issue in itself, and as such is beyond the
aim of this work. Suffice to say here that the results of peace-building can be measured
by less demanding criteria, such as the absence of violent conflict, recovery of GDP or
holding of democratic elections, or by more long-term indicators of success such as the
existence of functional democratic state after the withdrawal of the international
mission. If the later criterion were to be employed, the corollary would not be not very
impressive, at best. Yet drawing on the analyses of the most illustrative examples of
failed peace-building enterprises (e.g. Somalia, or maybe Iraq), and the most successful
ones (e.g. East Timor, or Germany), clears the way for identifying some common factors
shaping the final outcome of these exercises. Presenting briefly the most striking lessons
of these missions can be very useful to understand, and perhaps predict, trends and
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dynamics of the international peace-building endeavor in Kosovo (which is the main
theme of this work).
     In general, every peace-building mission, in order to be successful, presupposes a
clear political and legal mandate, which necessarily requires a certain degree of
consensus among the key players. Morton Abramovitz and Heather Halburt (2004)
rightly conclude that “if international problem-solvers cannot agree about how the
problem will be solved, trouble almost certainly follows.”
    Historical record firmly demonstrates that “pacification” is a vital precondition for
any peace-building endeavor to produce results. The failure of the UN mandated mission
in Somalia (see Hass, 1999), where the minimum standards of security were never
reached, is the best example in this regard. Iraq, after the US lead invasion in 2003, is
maybe another more striking example. This element, normally, requires the monopoly
on the use of force by international peace-building agent(s), at least until the authorized
indigenous military and law-enforcement structures are able to maintain security. This
task, admittedly, is not fulfilled only by inserting legal provisions into the peace accords,
UN resolutions, or other relevant documents giving rise to peace-building missions,
which assign to the international forces the primary or exclusive authority to use force.
More than that, soldiers must be determined and prepared to use force if it serves to
overall objective of the mission. The failure to arrest the former leader of the Bosnian
Serbs, Radovan Karadzic and his military commander general Ratko Mladic (both of
whom are indicted by an international tribunal for genocide), even one decade after the
war ended, shows that peace-builders, or their headquarters, sometimes lack the
readiness to fulfil risky duties. This fact hinders the progress of missions and prompts
distrust among the local population.
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   Beyond the above preconditions for successful peace-building, one has to bear in mind
that these missions involve chiefly profound sociopolitical, and hence cultural,
transformations. Namely the kind of liberal democracy, which is supposed to supersede
the conflicting tendencies once the peace-builders “finish their job,” necessarily touches
upon the controversial issue of cultural factors. In this sense, the lack of results in
advancing the liberal democratization project was often explained in terms of the
cultural fabric of certain peoples and regions, who supposedly resist modernization (and
hence the liberal democratization) more than others. This issue has generated very
contradictory debates. In the context of peace-building missions, historical record firmly
demonstrates that the liberal democratic projects proved more plausible in countries that
possessed a degree of sociopolitical and cultural predispositions. However, there are few
(if any) arguments to boost the hypothesis that these predispositions are the result of
some genetically inherited, religious or other constant factors. Rather, the degree of
readiness of certain countries or cultures to the transformations promoted by the peace-
building missions is primarily a reflection of the specific factors produced by particular
historical experiences, and as such they are changeable. The post-WWII transformations
of Japan and West Germany, and the transitional administration of East Timor (1999),
are often advanced as a paragon of successful peace-building enterprises. Yet, at one
point it was said that Japan could not be made democratic or Catholicism (East Timor is
a predominantly Catholic country) could not be made compatible with liberal
democracy.31 What these and other examples demonstrate, however, is that countries
that had prior capitalist experience, and enjoy a certain degree of economic development
                                                          
31 For example the famous sociologist Max Weber (quoted in Etzioni, 2004)  observed that “some cultures
are less disposed to capitalism – and other features of modernization – than the others. Concretely,
Catholics, Orthodox and Confucians are less so disposed than Protestants.”
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as well as social homogeneity are more open for transformations promoted by the peace-
building exercises.
   This brings us to the important issue of legitimacy of actions taken across the
national/state frontiers with the aim of installing a specific model of sociopolitical and
economic life. In fact, the question of legitimacy of peace-building operations can be
viewed either in terms of their international political and legal bases, or from the
perspective of acceptability of the “social engineering” by the target country. In the
former context, as Michal Pugh (1995: 325) argues, peace-building is widely assumed to
be legitimate, because it represents a humanitarian impetus of the international
community and also, through expanding “the democratic zone,” it offers global security
benefits. As to the perceptions of local population, which is subjected to peace-building
missions, it is widely accepted that these missions suffer from democratic deficit.
Namely there is no clear legal mechanism which would enable the locals to exercise any
meaningful influence in the directions and policies, let alone the objectives, of peace-
building, nor to hold “the international power-holders” responsible for their bad policy.
In such circumstances, local consent, which is crucial for the normal development of
these operations, is usually derived from the local political, religious or clan leaders.  For
obvious reasons, this consent can be achieved far more easily in socially homogeneous
countries (e.g. East Timor) than in those fragmented through ethnic, religious or other
lines (e.g. Somalia, Bosnia).
    The other factors that influence the success or failure of the peace-building missions
are related to more technical issues. These include the level of invested effort, in terms
of personnel (civilian and military), money and time; the design of the missions-
particularly unity of command, their multilateral bases, and similar factors.
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3.2  Inside the international administration in Kosovo
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted on June 10 1999, which indeed largely
legalized the de facto situation created by NATO’s intervention, represents the basic
point of reference which one should first look at to understand the overall post-war
international administration in Kosovo. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
this resolution creates an unusual, sui generis, legal status over Kosovo. 32 While
formally recognizing the sovereign rights of the FRY over Kosovo, the latter is deprived
almost totally from exercising basic sovereign powers. Namely, by virtue of Resolution
1244 and subsequent legal documents deriving thereon, the FRY33 is deprived the right
to maintain meaningful military presence34 in Kosovo, to exercise law-making and law-
enforcement powers, economic and monetary policy, external representation and other
sovereign prerogatives (Zimmerman and Stahn, 2001: 436-460). Instead, Resolution
1244 provides for the establishment of an interim international civil and military
presence in Kosovo, empowered with a very broad mandate, encompassing all the
classical governmental functions. Hence, pending the final settlement of the politico-
legal status, Kosovo is de facto transformed into a so-called “internationalized territory”
or “internationally administered territory,” a practice originating from the League of
Nations and latter applied by the United Nations on several occasions. Such definition
can be applied to those territorial arrangements where international organizations (LoN
or UN ) or a particular state or group of states authorized by them, exercise full or partial
                                                          
32 This Resolution can be reached at www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo1.htm, (lastly consulted on
29.4.2004).
33 Under the new constitution adopted on 4 February 2003, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed
its name into the Republic Serbia and Montenegro.
34 Paragraph 2of Annex 2 of the Resolution orders the withdrawal of all Yugoslav military, police and
paramilitary forces from Kosovo, while permitting their return only in limited and exceptional cases and
upon the approval of the Commander of international security forces.
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sovereign jurisdiction over a territory -in terms of legislative, executive or judicial
functions (see Milano, 2003: 1003). The exercise of classical governmental powers by
international organizations is not new. Throughout its lifetime the League of Nations on
several occasions acted as administrator of territories.35 This practice was continued and
multiplied in the UN era. Thus, the UN was authorized to perform governmental powers
in, what was supposed to become, “Free Territory of Trieste” in 1947, and in Jerusalem
(1947/48), but these missions were never materialized.36 Throughout the Cold War
period, UN served on several cases as administrator of territories (e.g. Libya, Italian
Somaliland, Eritrea etc), but this was in the de-colonization context and therefore these
(and other) territories were put under UN Trusteeship System,37 which is not the case
with Kosovo. With the end of the Cold War, the UN’s role in performing territorial
administration multiplied and became largely intertwined with both; traditional and new
peacekeeping functions, under the new concept of multidimensional peace operations.
Some of the most typical examples include the United Nations Transitional Assistance
Group in Namibia-UNTAG (1989 –1990), United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia-UNTAC (1992 - 1993),United Nations Transitional Administration in
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium in Croatia -UNTAES (1996 –1998),
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (1999 – 2000) to mentions
just few (see Griffin and Jones, 2000: 75-88). These UN missions were empowered with
                                                          
35 Some of the examples during the LoN era include administration of the German Saar Territory (1920-
1935)35, “Free City of Danzing” in Poland (1920 – 1929), Columbian town and district of Leticia (1933 –
1934) etc, (see American Journal of International Law, 2002)
36 Trieste was a disputed territory between Yugoslavia and Italy. UN plan failed to create international
administration over the territory as the superpowers could not agree about the appointment of the
international administrator. The scenario for granting to Jerusalem a special status, by putting it under the
UN administration under the UN Plan for Partition of Palestine, adopted in 1947, also failed because the
Palestinians did not accept it (Zimmerman and Stahn, 2001: 431; see also for the same cases American
Journal of International Law, 2002).
37 Trusteeship System was established under the Chapter XII of the UN Charter to guide the administrated
territories towards the self-government and independence. It replaced the Mandates System existing under
the League of Nations (Zimmerman and Stahn, 2001).
64
very sweeping and multidimensional responsibilities and objectives, ranging from law-
making functions, managing return of refugees, verification and/or maintaining
ceasefire, human rights protection and promotion, electoral functions, and exercising of
other classical executive functions (Griffin and Jones, 2000: 75-88).  In general, as one
can easily notice in above cases, the UN was empowered to perform mixed tasks, from
those attributed to traditional peacekeeping functions (e.g. verification of ceasefire), to
others pertaining to governmental functions (e.g. law-making or organizing elections).
While the international mission in Kosovo (and East Timor alike) embrace most of these
characteristics, it also has a number of features that make it different from the other
similar peace operations developed in the aftermath of the Cold War. As it will be
explored below, the scope and complexity of the powers and responsibilities vested in
the international mission in Kosovo is unprecedented.
3.2.1. The legal basis of international administration in Kosovo
The UN mission in Kosovo, from the legal standpoint, meets all the criteria to be
qualified as an enforcement measure under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Resolution 1244, which is the legal source of international administration in Kosovo, in
its preamble, makes reference to the responsibilities of the Security Council to maintain
international peace and security. It further determines the situation in Kosovo as a
“threat to international peace and security,” making therefore clear that the international
involvement in Kosovo should be viewed as falling within the Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. However, one important side of the story, usually neglected, are political
developments that gave rise to the Resolution 1244. Indeed there were two politico-legal
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documents preceding this resolution, and in fact giving shape to it, which are worth
mentioning.  First, the Serbian Parliament and the FRY Government accepted on June 3,
1999 “the General Principles on a Political Solution to the Kosovo Crisis,” adopted on
May 6, 1999 by the G-8, which were supposed to serve as a blueprint for the
international mandate in Kosovo. Second, on June 9 1999, FRY signed an agreement
(“Kumanovo Agreement”) with NATO, which provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav
forces and deployment of NATO troops in Kosovo. Resolution 1244 in its preamble
“welcomes” acceptance of the “general principles” by the FRY. Moreover the “general
principles” are incorporated as Annex I to that resolution. Clearly, in light of these
developments, one can argue that the deployment of the international civil and military
personnel in Kosovo was based on the consent of FRY, and hence the mission does not
deviate from the traditional peacekeeping concept. However, this is the political side of
the story, which in this case contradicts the legal one. Namely the appropriate
interpretation of the Resolution 1244, especially in relation to the mandate of the
military component of the mission (to be discussed below), as well as the qualification
of the situation as a “threat to international peace” leaves no doubt that the mission in
Kosovo is clearly a peace-enforcement operation falling under Chapter VII.
3.2.2  Structure of the mission: civilian and military components
Burden sharing between the UN and regional (and other) organizations is one of the
most evident features of the peace operation in Kosovo. Since the beginning, the mission
has been subdivided between different organizations, each of them performing specific
functions, but all of them operating to some degree under the UN umbrella. First and
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most important subdivision is between the civilian and military components of the
mission. According to the Resolution 1244 (article 5), international presence in Kosovo
is twofold:
1. Military component; composed of NATO and those states which cooperate with
NATO in the framework of “International Security Force – KFOR”;
2. Civilian component; known as The United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo- UNMIK.
    On the other side, the civilian component of the mission is coordinated by the UN and
implemented through the joint efforts of the main European regional organizations.
3.2.2.1   International Security Force-KFOR: legal basis, mandate, command and
              control
 In 1994, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pointed out that the UN
should rely on the “coalitions of willing,” rather than conducting itself in large-scale
enforcement actions (Malone and Wermester, 2000: 47). The international military
presence in Kosovo is a typical example of the “coalition of the willing,” acting under,
albeit very loose, UN auspices. In fact, the legality of the international military presence
in Kosovo derives from two inter-related documents, namely Resolution 1244, and the
“Kumanovo Agreement”.  Article 7 of the Resolution 1244 “authorizes the member
states and relevant international organizations to establish international security presence
in Kosovo with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities ….” Further, Article 5 of
Annex II, explicitly reconfirms the leading role of NATO in the coalition of
international forces operating within the framework of KFOR. On the other hand, the
“Kumanovo Agreement,” apart from setting the conditions and time-plan for the
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withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and creating a de-militarized zone on
the FRY side of the border, basically imposes on the latter the obligation not to hinder
KFOR’s activities.
     KFOR initially came under the overall command of the Supreme Allied Command
Europe (SACEUR), and later its chain of command changed in accordance with
NATO’s internal structural changes and circumstances on the ground. KFOR is
composed by troops from 30 NATO and non-NATO countries (most of them from the
“PfP” states). KFOR is organized in 5 Multinational Brigades (MNB), respectively five
sectors, headed by the Multinational Brigade Commander. At central level, a general
Commander of KFOR rotates among the NATO countries on a six-month basis,
reflecting troop sizes and other contributions to the force (see NATO Handbook; 2001)
He fulfils the coordinating role with the civilian part of the mission and exercise
supreme authority related to security matters in Kosovo. Each sector comes within the
military authority of five NATO states; namely US, Great Britain, Germany, France and
Italy. Accordingly, the Commanders of the five Multinational Brigades come form these
countries, as well as a substantial part of the soldiers and other military infrastructure.
The commanders of the Multinational Brigades are at the top of the command hierarchy
in their sector, while each national contingent has its own internal command chain.
    According to Article 9 of the Resolution1244, KFOR is assigned very broad tasks and
powers. The most important KFOR responsibilities include: deterring the hostilities,
maintaining and where necessary enforcing a cease-fire; ensuring the withdrawal and
preventing the return to Kosovo of the FRY police and military forces; demilitarizing the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA);  establishing a secure environment in which refugees
and displaced persons can return home in safety and the international civil presence can
operate; supervising mine-clearing activities; supporting, as appropriate, and
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coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence; conducting border
monitoring duties as required. Quite normally, the KFOR’s “Rules of Engagement”
provide for very flexible mandate to use force.
3.2.2.2   United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosvo-UNMIK: legal
              basis, mandate and structure
When UN entered a war-ravaged Kosovo, it was empowered basically to start the
process of remaking public (institutional) life from scratch, as well as to address the
wide humanitarian problems left by the conflict. Resolution 1244 empowered the
UNMIK with wide and multilevel tasks and responsibilities. Thus UNMIK is called to: 
perform basic civilian administrative functions, promote the establishment of substantial
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, facilitate a political process to determine
Kosovo's future status, coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international
agencies, support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, maintain civil law and order, 
promote human rights, assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and
displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo, and other similar tasks (paragraph 11 of this
Resolution). Although this Resolution fell short of determining a clear time-table for
UNMIK’s withdrawal from Kosovo, it nevertheless outlined four phases for the
development of state authority in the latter (Brand, 2001: 467-468). Thus, in the first
phase, UNMIK was supposed to perform basic civilian and administrative functions
(including law and order). The second phase, involves creation of democratic local
institutions for provisional self-government. In the third phase, UNMIK should work to
facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status. In the fourth
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phase, UNMIK is supposed to oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s
provisional institutions to the institutions established under the political settlement.
    The level of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is another unique
feature of UNMIK. In fact, UNMIK is a joint undertaking of the UN and two European
regional organizations, namely EU and OSCE. This cooperation is structured in the form
of four pillars, which altogether constitute UNMIK. Pillar I: Police and Justice; is
organized under the direct leadership of the United Nations (until June 2000 this pillar
was called “humanitarian assistance” and was led by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR); Pillar II: Civil Administration; is also run
directly by the United Nations, and covers the exercise of basic administrative functions,
at the local and central level; Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building; is led
by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is in
charge of democratization and good governance, organization of the elections, media
affairs, human rights monitoring, rule of law and police education, and development.
Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development; is run by the European Union
(EU), which includes a wide scope of activities related to overall economic
development. These four pillars work as a classical government under the leadership of
the top UN civilian official in Kosovo- The Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG). The heads of the four pillars are at the same time Deputies of SRSG,
and are directly responsible to him (Brand, 2001: 464). The SRSG is the ultimate
executive and legislative authority while he is also the highest official in the
administration of judiciary. Resolution 1244 (paragraph 6) determines that the SRSG is
appointed by the UN Secretary-General, after consultations with the Security Council,
for one-year term and is responsible directly to him. The SRSG, however, does not have
any political/legal power over the KFOR, due to the fact that the civilian and military
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components of the UN mission in Kosovo are basically independent (see Brand, 2001:
464).38
3.2.3  International mission in Kosovo in scrutiny: what has been achieved?
The presence of some conventional factors supportive of peace-building, presented in
the previous chapter, enabled the international mission in Kosovo to make significant
progress in political and economic transformation. Despite uncertainty about the
political status of the territory, the international administration in Kosovo from the very
beginning had the advantage of benefiting from the great international commitment to
the mission, in terms of money and manpower. On the other hand, the fact that
Albanians, who constitute around ninety percent of the population, were generally
supportive of the international administration is surely not just an additional source of
legitimacy, but also a crucial factor for its successful performance. The case of Somalia,
or even Iraq, demonstrate that even a small portion of population, ready to rely on
violent means, can obstruct, not to say prevent, any meaningful transformation from
occurring. As a result of these factors, in spite of the weaknesses and failures of the
international administration in Kosovo, the track record of progress is significant.
Democratic institutions, at the central and local level, were set up almost from scratch,
following the local and central elections organized in a relatively free and democratic
atmosphere. Most importantly, as a study on nation-building published by the Rand
                                                          
38 Although operating under UN mandate, the military and civilian components of the international
administration in Kosovo remain mutually independent. According to the terms of Resolution 1244, both
KFOR and UNMIK must “operate towards the same goals and in mutually supportive manner.” However,
this resolution contains no clear provisions as to the coordination and cooperation neither between the
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Institute (2003: 119-129)  emphases “the UN and NATO performed with considerable, if
not uniform, success the difficult task of persuading the KLA leadership to pursue its
political aspirations for power through the open and democratic means of free elections,”
something not very common for ex-guerrilla movements. The fact that the results of
elections, a central component of a democratic process, were fully recognized by all
sides (including the political parties emerging from the political wing of KLA, who lost
them), marked a great achievement of the democratic process. Finally, Kosovo enjoyed a
rapid recovery of per capita GDP, a very quick renewal of the private economic sector
(Rand Institute, 2003: 2), and also an admirable progress in the functioning of free
media and civil society organizations.
3.2.4 Challenges encountered
Commenting on the March 2004 disturbances in Kosovo,39 the International Crisis
Group (2004: 1) argued that “UNMIK is considered as inappropriate to prepare Kosovo
for transition from war to peace, from socialist to market economy and from
international political limbo to final status.” In fact, the international mission from the
outset was faced with great challenges of different nature, quite normal in such a
mission, and had manifested a lot of weaknesses. Highlighting them is of crucial
importance, as they can serve as useful lessons for future peace operations of this nature,
and can shed light on prospects for the future of Kosovo. In discussing the challenges
and problems facing the international mission in Kosovo, one should start by noting that
                                                                                                                                                                          
civilian and military components of the mission, nor between NATO and UN in general. Only article 20
makes a vague reference to the coordination between the UN Secretary General and KFOR…
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the underlying cause of the Kosovo conflict, namely the question of the political status
of the territory, has not been addressed yet. This fundamental issue, however, shall be
elaborated in the next chapter.
    A brief look at the failures start from the fact that Kosovo remains the poorest region
in Europe, with very low production, weak industry, and above all with around 57%
unemployment rate40. Apart from stumbling over the overall progress, in the eyes of the
local population economic stagnation has largely overshadowed the successes of
UNMIK in other areas.
   On the other hand, in the first year of their mission UNMIK and KFOR could do little
to prevent the retaliatory attacks of angry Albanians against the Serbs of Kosovo (see
Yannis, 2001: 35-40), who in turn had to pay a high price for the policy and the leader
(Milosevic) they had so fiercely promoted during 198O. Instead, although UNMIK is
empowered by Resolution 1244 to exercise full powers in Kosovo (meaning all its
territory), the latter has tolerated, at least initially, the existence of parallel Serbian
institutions and laws in Serb-dominated northern part of Kosovo. This fact ignited
frustration and fear on the Albanian side, leading many to believe that UNMIK is
actually creating a fait accompli, namely the division of Kosovo, advocated by some
Serbian circles (to be elaborated in the following chapter). UNMIK (and KFOR alike)
have also had a poor record in confronting organized crime of different kinds, which
threatens the overall progress in Kosovo.
                                                                                                                                                                          
39 Following the death of three Albanian kids who allegedly were dragged into the water of  river while
attempting to escape from a mob of Serbian youngsters who were chasing them, in the Serbian controlled
Northern Part of Kosovo, on March 2004, Albanians reacted by attacking Serbian enclaves and UNMIK.
40 One can obtain data’s related to unemployment in Kosovo from the reports prepared by the UNDP,
available at: www.ks.undp,org, (lastly consulted on 11.5.2005).
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3.2.4.1  Creating a new legal order
By providing for the “establishment of an interim administration in Kosovo,” Resolution
1244 has vested on UNMIK law-making powers. Creating a new legal order, therefore,
was the first main challenge facing UNMIK. Relying on his powers under this
Resolution, the SRSG has continuously adopted a series of “regulations” which enjoy
direct applicability in Kosovo. Their very name “regulation,” instead of laws, denotes
their interim and specific character, revealing the fact that Kosovo is placed under an
unusual UN legal order (Zimmerman and Stahn: 2001: 443). Yet, in exercising its law-
making functions, UNMIK did not make a complete break with the previous legal order
that existed in Kosovo. Instead, the new legal framework is largely based on the
principle of continuity, reflecting also the formal perseverance of Yugoslav sovereignty
over Kosovo. Accordingly, UNMIK (in its REG No. 1999/1, Sec. 3) provided that “the
Yugoslav laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall
continue to apply insofar as they do not conflict with internationally recognized human
rights standards.”
    But acceptance of the legitimacy of laws adopted after the forceful abrogation of the
autonomous status of Kosovo (1989) met with the refusal of local judges and public
prosecutors, who refused to apply, what they considered to be, discriminatory laws
against Albanians. The local legal community started applying the legislation that was in
force before the suspension of the autonomous status of Kosovo, particularly in criminal
matters. In order to solve this problem, the SRSG decided to codify new legal practice,
determining that besides UNMIK legal acts, laws with direct applicability in Kosovo
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should also include those legal acts which were in force on 22 March 1989.41 Overall,
this experience highlighted the need for meaningful and timely planned actions, when
the aim is so complex (such as creation of a new legal order). Obviously, this was not
the case in Kosovo.
3.2.4.2   Legitimizing the “rule exercised by foreigners” and transferring
              authority to the locals
While in the traditional peacekeeping legitimacy of the mission derives from the consent
of the host state, and from the UN mandate pursuant to its collective security functions,
in Kosovo this issue is more complex. Inspired by the idea that Kosovo was moving
towards overall progress and final independence (which is the desire of the great
majority of its population), the Kosovar Albanians initially regarded the UN presence
with appreciation. The feeling of sympathy was (and still is) huge especially towards
NATO and hence KFOR, because of its role in bringing freedom to Kosovo. Yet as the
time passed, they came to realize that the future status of their country is uncertain, or
perhaps even undesirable, while freedom did not bring economic progress and other
preconditions needed for normal life. As a consequence, the feeling of disappointment
began to take place, whereby, as the Kosovar Institute for Political Research and
Development (2002) underlines, ”the Kosovars share the sentiment that Kosovo needed
the security of the peacekeepers and not an omnipresent tutorship at all levels and
spheres of public life by the UNMIK.”
                                                          
41 Only if a situation was not covered by said legislation, laws in force after 22 March 1989 could be
applied insofar as they were not discriminatory or in violation of internationally recognized human rights
 standards.
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    The UN from the very beginning was driven by the objective of creating an interim
“substantial autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY,” while not making any substantial
progress with regards to the facilitation of  the political process that will lead to final
settlement of status. Yet, the vague dispositions of the Resolution 1244 triggered
contradictory views about the limit of “substantial autonomy.” However, ever since the
first year it stepped in the Kosovo, UNMIK engaged in serious efforts to create a local
politico-institutional framework and transfer powers to it. This process culminated with
the organization of local (2000 and 2002) and central (2001, 2004) elections, leading to
the creation of central and municipal “provisional” institutions of self-government”
(including parliament, government and president). In addition, the legal framework for
sharing of powers between the local and international institutions was laid down with the
adoption, on May 2001, of the Constitutional Framework (see Brand, 2001: 469-471).
Nevertheless, the process of transferring powers to Kosovo’s institutions was very slow,
owing to UNMIK’s attempts to balance between the necessity to empower the local self-
governing structures, and opposition coming from the Belgrade regime, who
instrumentalized the tiny Serbian minority in Kosovo for this purpose the. The latter
either boycotted (if not obstructed), or were lukewarm to participate in the process of
creation of Kosovo’s self-governing institutions, despite the fact that the Constitutional
Framework, and other relevant legal documents, laid down a very solid basis for
protection of minorities. The Constitutional Framework applies the so-called model of
“positive discrimination,” through providing for the reserved places (quotas) for Serbs
and other minority, in terms of their representation in central Kosovo’s institutions.
Further, this process is impeded by the unknown future status of Kosovo, and thus
unclear “final stage” of the transfer of powers to Kosovo’s institutions.
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    Another very important aspect of the international mission in Kosovo, is the degree of
commitment to human rights and democratization principles. Despite the admirable
progress, the international and local human rights groups have voiced their concerns for
some anomalies characterizing this field; such as the broad privileges and immunities of
UNMIK and (especially) KFOR, concentration of almost unlimited powers on the one
institution/person-SRSG, particularly its powers to issue executive orders related to
arrest and detention (Brand, 2001: 476-477). Without going into details, the Kosovo case
demonstrates how difficult it is for UN to balance security priorities and human rights
concerns, in missions where the latter is an international priority.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL PEACE-BUILDING MISSION IN KOSOVO IN
PERSPECTIVE: A NEW BEGINNING OR ANOTHER CRACK ON
THE WALL?
NATO intervention against Yugoslavia and the subsequent installation of the
international civilian and military administration over Kosovo, created a profoundly new
political environment in the region. The international community, particularly its most
powerful states, became direct and major players in the Kosovo problem, for the first
time in the long history of this conflict. Also for the first time, with broader international
consensus, Kosovo was left a without meaningful presence of Serbian repressive state
apparatus, e.g. army and police, the latter having been the major attribute of Belgrade’s
policy towards Albanians for almost one century. On the other hand, the fall of
Milosevic’s regime, following peaceful street protests in Belgrade on October 5, 2000,
strengthened the hope for a new perspective in the region, whereby conflicts and
cleavages would be left to history.
    In light of the above developments, the first normal question to be raised by any
observer confronted with the Kosovo problem is: are we really witnessing the
dismantling of the “Balkan’s powder keg?”- a qualification earned due to the
destabilizing potential of this problem. In other words, is the current international peace-
building operation in Kosovo leading to a permanent solution of the old dispute between
Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo, opening therefore the prospect for normalization of
relations between the two nations, or is this just an offhand attempt of the international
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community with little chances for success? Drawing on the main conclusions
highlighted by the first two chapters, this chapter will answer this question. Or, to put it
more simply, it strives to give an answer as to whether the eventual expansion of the
“democratic zone” will be a sufficient factor to solve the problem once and forever, or
the Balkan conflicts (including Kosovo) will continue to be held in check only “by the
presence of a quarter of million NATO-led soldiers committed to the region,” as Carl
Bild observed (Bild, 2001: 149). In doing so, this chapter confronts the underlying
assumptions upon which the peace-building concept is constructed, the latter understood
in dogmatic terms, with the nature of the Kosovo conflict, and wider regional dynamics
and processes.
4.1  Peace-building in the wrong address:  who needs a “social engineering”?
If the current international administration in Kosovo is to be analyzed based solely on
the degree of democratic transformation, or adoption of the principles of liberal
democracy and free market economy by the Kosovar society, than a cautious optimism
could be the underlying corollary. However, the final judgement on the current
international peace-building exercise in Kosovo will not be drawn based on track record
of democratic achievements of Kosovar society. Rather, it will depend on the degree to
which the intentional community will succeed in erasing the causes of conflict, and
creating local structures and environment that would guarantee sustainable peace and
stability.
    In reality, viewed from the traditional perspective, the current international mission in
Kosovo is deviation from the very idea of peace-building. Namely, in general terms, as
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discussed in the previous chapter, peace-building was invented as an option for dealing
with the trouble-making countries, that is, failed or defeated states (see Hass, 1999: 61-
134). None of these qualifications apply to the Kosovo case. The latter is not a state,
formally it is still part of the Republic Serbia and Montenegro (the new name for the
“third” Yugoslavia created from these two entities), while Kosovar Albanians, who are
the major object of “social engineering” project, were actually the victims, not the
troublemakers. Following this seemingly dogmatic line of reasoning, it would have been
logical and more appropriate to put Serbia under international administration, and hence
impose democratic transformation upon the Serbian society. This is not to say that
Kosovo does not need democratic transformation, or that it will not benefit, in this
regard, from international administration. However, bearing in mind that in peace-
building missions, democratic transformation is a means for reaching the ultimate end,
i.e. the creation of sustainable peace, it is not just a mistake but also irony to try to
change the victims, not the aggressor, as it is the case with the international mission in
Kosovo (and Bosnia alike). Just as it would have been a paradox to put Czechoslovakia
or Poland, instead of Germany, under Allied control after the WWII.
4.2   How much has Serbia changed?
 In a report on Serbian nationalism in the post-Milosevic era The Helsinki Committee
for Human Rights in Serbia (2003: 6) observed that “the project of Greater Serbia drew a
consensus unparalleled in modern Serbian history.” Although other additional factors
cannot be excluded, it was the Serbian attempt to realize this project forcefully – namely
to expand its borders at the expense of other Yugoslav republics/states, that lead to the
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prolonged wars in these territories. Therefore, the stability of the region is primarily
hostage to alteration of the political agenda of Serbian state/society, respectively,
relinquishing its hegemonic ambitions and changing its perceptions about the past and
its neighbors. This does not imply that Serbian society should be collectively punished
for the aggressive policy of their state. The argument of collective guilt, and hence
collective punishment, was firmly rejected by the international community. This stance
is faithfully expressed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), seated at The Hague. Nevertheless, any meaningful form of international
control over Serbia (similar to Bosnia for example) would not have taken the form of
punishment for the wrong doings of Belgrade during the last decade, but would have
confronted directly the major source of instability in the region. Quite normally, Serbian
society would have been one of the major beneficiaries. This suggestion looks highly
hypothetical, apart from totally disregarding the international geopolitical context, which
would render such a scenario very difficult, if not impossible.
    Yet, even after military defeat, and overthrow of the regime that tried forcefully to
expand Serbian borders, the latter is not giving any clear sign of full recovery from the
political and cultural mindset that created the “Greater Serbia” project and Milosevic
(who is currently in trial for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity at the
ICTY). The enthusiasm sparked by the October 2000 changes in Serbia, especially
among the EU countries (see Yanis, 2001: 12), proved to be short-lived, if not naive. In
fact, as International Crises Group (2004a: 3) rightly concludes, shortly after this date, it
became increasingly apparent that “5 October 2000, the day on which Milosevic steeped
down, was less revolutionary than it seemed at the time.” The internal political dynamics
in the post-Milosevic era have amply demonstrated that the Serbian society is hardly
capable of loosening up itself from the claws of the past, and getting on the right track of
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democratic transition. The democratic credentials of the opposition that ousted
Milosevic are questionable (none of these parties, for example, stood firmly against
Milosevic’s repressive policy in Kosovo during the 1990s). Most importantly, some of
the institutions of paramount social and political importance, particularly the Army and
Church, still remain as the sources of inspiration of archaic nationalism and xenophobia
(Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2003). The assassination of the
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, on March 12 2003, was the first major blow to
international hopes. Djindjic was widely perceived as a personification not only of the
opposition to Milosevic through the 1990s, but also a symbol of pro-Western, reform-
oriented, course of the Serbian society. He fell victim to his democratic reformist efforts,
especially his more cooperative stance with the ICTY. The fact that segments of the
Army, Serbian secret service and underground crime were involved in his assassination
plot, revealed the strong alliance between organized crime, radical nationalism and
politics in Serbia (see Public International Law & Policy Group, 2003). Furthermore, the
strong standing of nationalist parties in almost all elections after October 2000 just blurs
the reformist path. Thus, after the parliamentary elections that took place in December
2003, political parties that are either opposed to or are ambivalent about EU integration,
control 71 percent of the Serbian parliament, while the ultra nationalist Serbian Radical
Party, which still engages for the expansion of the Serbia’s borders, and whose leader is
being tried at the Hague for war crimes, secured around one third of the parliamentary
seats.42 And even more disquieting than the strength of the nationalist forces is the
inertia and lack of a clear vision of those forces pertaining to belong to the pro-reformist
                                                          
42 During the electoral campaign, the president of SRS Nikolic reiterated the calls of its predecessor,
Voislav Seselj, for inclusion of substantial parts of Croatia and Bosnia within the Serbian border
(International Crisis Group, 2005: 12).
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bloc. The lukewarm stance, if not rejections, towards the ICTY43 (the latter is in a way
writing a recent history of the former Yugoslavia, albeit by not judging the character of
the wars), is a test for Serbia’s readiness to break with its past. Thus far, not only the
nationalist circles have manifested a strong opposition towards the ICTY, but also the
reformist forces have used cooperation with this tribunal as a bargaining chip for
securing economic or political benefits, disregarding thus the moral dimension of this
issue (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2003: 7). As a result, Serbia for
long has become a safe haven for many indicted war criminals, while the surrender of
some of them, qualified as “big fish,” was carried out only after prolonged pressure by
the international community. Moreover, according to the polls the former Bosnian Serb
President, Radovan Karadzic, and his chief military commander general Ratko Mladic –
two most wanted persons by the war crimes tribunal, are still considered the “two
greatest defenders of the Serbian nation”(Devic, 2003: 2).
  On the other hand, the mythical perception of reality and the identity of the victim, two
of the most destructive sides of Serbian nationalism, are only being strengthened after
the war in Kosovo. The war with NATO is glorified, and is named as the “second
Kosovo battle,”44 while the casus belli for this conflict, namely the attempt to
exterminate Albanians, is totally ignored. The general picture about the recent past in
Serbian collective perceptions remain incredibly distorted, whereas the Serbs, once
again, perceive themselves as victims of an unjust NATO “aggression” and an Albanian
terrorist movement designed to create “Greater Albania” (International Crisis Group,
2005). The same way of perceiving the past prevails with regards to the other recent
wars in which Serbs were involved (Croatia and Bosnia). Several public polls conducted
                                                          
43 For more information about the ICTY see its web site http://www.un.org/icty.
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in 2001, for example, found that 52.5 percent of respondents in Serbia could not name a
single war crime committed by Serbian forces in Bosnia, Croatia, or Kosovo. Nearly
half, however, could name at least three crimes committed against Serbian civilians by
other forces (Devic, 2003: 2). This collective mindset, further exacerbated by the bad
economic situation, renders very difficult any confrontation with the recent past, so
desperately needed for the political and moral recovery of Serbia. And until the Serb
nation firmly breaks with the past, and takes its part of responsibility for crimes
committed in its name, prospects for a profound democratic transformation looks
gloomy, let alone the normalization of relations with its neighbors (once enemies).
    Normally, international actors, as has been the case throughout history, will continue
to play a crucial role in shaping the fate not only of Serbia, but also of the whole region.
This time the policy of the “westerners,” who are the major players, is not guided by the
desire to expand spheres of influence, in the classical meaning of the term. Rather their
strategy is centered on the extension of their value systems, which, in turn, is supposed
to bring stability and prosperity to Europe’s problematic backyard. The process of
integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly the European Union (EU), is
used as a mechanism stimulating the creation of a cultural backdrop conductive to
democracy.  In this context, any in depth observation of the prospects for the future of
democratic transition in Serbia will not be complete without analyzing the Euro-Atlantic
integration processes, especially EU enlargement. The question of Serbia’s prospects for
integration into EU (or NATO), cannot be fully covered by the scope of this work.
Overall, despite the perplexities manifested by Serbia in terms of its reformist course,
political and economic incentive of the EU integration processes, developments in the
                                                                                                                                                                          
44 The glorification of the war in Kosovo is strong particularly in the military circles, who portray this war
as another “heroic war of brave and innocent Serbian people” (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in
Serbia, 2005: 12-14).
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neighborhood in these directions, and the bad economic situation, have been strong
enough to make membership in this organization one of the political priorities of
Belgrade (Public International Law & Policy Group, 2003: 17-19). On its part, Brussels
has vehemently proclaimed ever since the decline of Milosevic regime, that the doors for
Serbia and Montenegro are open, as there should not be a “black hole” in the process of
EU’s southeast expansion.45  To this end, the prospects for meaningful democratization
of Serbia will, at least partially, depend on the degree to which Brussels, and other
western capitals, will offer “sticks and carrots” to Belgrade. The feasibility study,
completed on April 2005, determined that the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
(SCG) is ready to start negotiations for Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).
However, the country so far has failed to reach major progress on two crucial issues-
strengthening of the state institutions and cooperation with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). While the problem with ICTY, as already
discussed, reflects the unwillingness of Serbia to face its ugly recent past, the deep
problems characterizing the life of the common state between Serbia and Montenegro is
primarily the failure of the EU, which was the architect of this, apparently disliked,
marriage. In broader perspective, the strong pro-independent tendencies in Montenegro
and the unresolved political status of Kosovo highlight the fact that dismemberment of
the former Yugoslavia has not yet come to its natural conclusion, and the international
community, particularly the EU, has to come to terms with this reality. These two issues,
especially the question of Kosovo, on the other hand, will represent the biggest test for
the democratization of Serbia, and for wider regional stability.
                                                          
45 This message was transmitted by the EU in its Zagreb Summit, on 24 November 2000 (Yannis,2001:12)
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 4.3   Untying the “Gordian knot”: addressing the final political status of Kosovo
The Kosovo problem did not arise primarily out of the mismanagement of political
power, or contradictions about the form of government. At the heart of this problem, as
the second chapter highlighted, is the dispute about the control of territory between the
Albanians (who opted for the independence of Kosovo) and the Serbs (who want to keep
it within Serbia). The maltreatment of Albanians by Serbian state, lately pursued by
Milosevic, indeed only lead to the violent manifestation of this problem. Therefore,
removal of the source of violence, by suspension of Belgrade’s right to rule with
Kosovo, has not yet eliminated the very root of the problem. Undoubtedly, the most
difficult task facing the international community in its unique undertaking in Kosovo is
addressing the final status of the country. Until very recently, international policy-
making centers have shown great reluctance to deal with the problem of status, believing
that delaying the decision will make it easier, as passions will cool down (see
International Crisis Group, 2004b), and the policy of the so-called “standards before
statues”46 goes pretty much along these lines. The hesitation to open the “hot issue” of
the status was also a reflection of the lack of consensus, not only at the local, but also at
the international level for this issue. However the growing frustration among the
Albanian majority in Kosovo, stemming from the uncertainty about their political future
and also lack of economic progress, is a wake up call, which seems to have waken up the
international policy-making centers. Consequently, this issue is getting back on the
table, turning again international attention towards the forgotten Balkans.
                                                          
46 The policy of “standards before status,” proclaimed by the SRSG Michale Stainer in 2003, basically
mean that Kosovo has to meet certain standards in terms of rule of law, minority rights, democratization,
economic development, institution building, before the question of final status is opened.
86
    The prospects for its solution, however, are complicated by the remarkably vague
disposition of the Resolution 1244. Thus, when it comes to addressing the future of
Kosovo, this resolution refers to three documents, namely: the Statement of G-8 Foreign
Ministers, the List of Principles Agreed by the Serbian Parliament, and the Rambouillet
Accords. These documents, however, apart from setting the ground for very broad and
different interpretations, refer to the contradictory guidelines for solving the political
status of Kosovo. Thus, the first two documents refer in more or less identical terms to
“an interim political framework agreement” to be reached “providing for substantial
self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of Rambouillet Accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY” (quoted in Zimmerman
and Stahn, 2001: 451:69). On the other hand, the Rambouillet Accords provided that the
final status of Kosovo shall be determined in an “international meeting,” taking into
account “the will of the people,” “opinions of the relevant authorities” and “The
Helsinki Final Act” (Zimmerman and Stahn, 2001). Obviously, “the will of the people”
referred to by this document, contradicts with the “safeguarding of the principles of the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY,” mentioned in the first two documents,
as the overwhelming majority of Kosovo’s population have clearly indicated that any
decision which does not mean independence is unacceptable to them.
    In a border sense, this issue touches upon the basic international law principles of self-
determination and the inviolability of frontiers. Essentially, the Kosovo problem brought
on the surface the gap created by the inability of international law to follow dynamic
political developments at the global level. Those who argue that the world’s political
problems of today can be solved only by relying dogmatically on vague international
legal frameworks, created decades or even centuries ago, forget the fundamental fact
that ever since its origin, international law has been an instrument of politics, not the
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vice versa. Henceforth, if international law cannot serve, or cannot follow the political
necessities it becomes meaningless.
    Creation and extinction of independent states is the most crucial and yet highly
controversial issue in international relations. International rules and norms related to this
issue are neither static nor clear. In the former Yugoslav context, recognition of the new
states was based on the so-called Uti possidetis principle, which was applied during de-
colonization in Latin America and Africa. This principle is centered on the idea that the
internal administrative borders of constitutive parts of dismembering sates were
transformed into state frontiers (see Hasani et al. 1999: 65-83). Yet, the way this
principle was applied in the course of Yugoslavia’s dismemberment created a juridical
and political opinion that Kosovo cannot become an independent state due to the legal
constrains on such a scenario. But deeper intrusion into the legal debate can make this
assumption very questionable, revealing the vague nature of international law. The
“Badinter Commission” driven from political or other reasons did not recognize to
Kosovars the right to secession, although Kosovo had its own administrative borders
which were never disputed, and which could not be changed without the consent of the
Kosovo Parliament under the 1974 constitution (Bellamy, 2002: 22-29). Further in this
regard, there are three generally accepted international law criteria for recognition of
new states (Montevideo Convention 1933); a) permanent population; b) defined
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states (Shaw,
1986: 127). Kosovo by now meets all of these criteria, as it has a compact population; it
has had clearly defined borders (corpus separandum) at least since 1913, when it came
under Serbian rule; currently it has its own governmental structures, which are
increasingly assuming sovereign powers from the UN administration, and which have
demonstrated capacity to engage in international relations. Even the “Constitutional
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Framework” (Chapter 1.1) recognizes that “Kosovo with its people has unique historical,
legal, cultural and linguistic attributes.” And finally, the legal argument in favor of the
independence of Kosovo can be derived from the emerging opinion among international
lawyers that the ruler loses the right to rule a particular group if it abuses that right
continuously.47
    Regardless of the way in which legal considerations are perceived and interpreted,
they are neither the sole nor the most important framework for solving the Kosovo
problem. So far, different options have being put forward at the “unofficial” level,
including proposals for federal or confederal arrangement between Kosovo, Serbia and
Montenegro, broad autonomy within Serbia (advocated by the Serbian side), separation
of Kosovo between the Serbs and Albanians, conditional independence or full
independence. In discussing possible prospects for the final status of Kosovo, an issue
which if not addressed timely and properly can be very dangerous, one should begin
from the very basic fact that it is simply impossible to force the Kosovar Albanians to
live with Serbian state under whatever form. Milosevic had convinced them, once again,
that Serbia is not their home, nor can it ever be. Even the Croats, Bosnians and other
Slavic groups once living under a common roof with the Serbs, and having much in
common ethnically and culturally, draw more or less the same historical lesson. So the
normal question troubling the Albanians is, being non-Slavic and different in ethnic,
linguistic and cultural terms, why they should be the remnant of a Yugoslav state- why
they have to be forced to live with Serbia under whatever arrangement? Quite normally,
this kind of scenario is not only unfeasible, as the majority of the Kosovo’s population
                                                          
47 Akhavan (in Clark et al. 1996: 239-240) comments that “according to an important Declaration of the
UN General Assembly, if a state is possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color, it is deemed to be acting in compliance with the
principle of self-determination, and thus its territorial integrity and political independence must be
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will resist it, but will also give impetus to Albanian nationalist extremism in the Balkans
(Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). This is so because the Albanians would
emerge as the major losers in the process of Yugoslav wars and border rearrangements
resulting from it (although they played the “good guy” in this game). On the other hand,
all attempts to convince the Kosovar Serbs to live in an independent Kosovo dominated
by the Albanian great majority will be doomed to failure, at least for a foreseeable
future. Serbs need to be convinced that in an independent Kosovo they will be treated
equally, while Albanians need to understand that Serbian state, not Serbian minority in
Kosovo, represent threat to them (as history convincingly demonstrates). Yet, the first
thing Serbs will need to do is to abandon their dreams of Serbian domination over
Kosovo, and instead think about how to build normal relations with their Albanian
neighbors, who constitute great majority of population. They should also be aware and
sensitive of horrors through which Albanians of Kosovo have passed at the hands of
Serbian state.
     The prospects for separation of Kosovo along ethnic lines, a reserve option of some
Serbs circles for a long time,48 apart from not finding support from international side,
would surely generate more problems than solutions. That would require exchange of
population, which obviously would not be possible to be carried out “humanly,” while
any new line drawn would not correspond to the ethno-demographic realities, as the
Serbs, a part from two tiny towns in northern Kosovo, were everywhere in a clear
minority. This solution would also automatically open the question of, Albanian
                                                                                                                                                                          
respected. Conversely, it would appear that a State which is engaged in a flagrant denial of the right to
self-determination to a distinct ethnic element of its population does not enjoy the same right …”
48 The idea of separation of Kosovo along ethnic lines was supported by Zoran Djindjic, who saw it as one
of the possible options. This idea was also propagated by the president of the Serbia Academy of Arts and
Science Aleksnder Despic, in 1996. Lately, Dobrica Cosic in his book Kosovo, published in 2004, engaged
for same solution (see Kaplan, 1998; International Crises Group, 2003: 12).
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dominated, Presevo valley in Southern Serbia, while disrupting the fragile interethnic-
balances in Bosnia and Macedonia.
    In fact the discussions related to the status of Kosovo are often related to the
reflections it will have in Bosnia and Macedonia. This aspect, therefore, merits a brief
elaboration. Arguments that an independent Kosovo will produce domino effect, in
negative terms, for Bosnia and Macedonia, is very often invoked by those opposing such
a solution, particularly by the Serbian side (see International Crises Group, 2005: 29).
Namely it is argued that if Kosovo becomes independent there will be nothing to prevent
the Republika Srpska (in Bosnia) and Albanians in Western Macedonia to do the same.
Yet, a careful look at the circumstances of these cases clearly reveals that they are
completely different. Without going into details, it is sufficient to say that comparison
with the Republika Srpska disregards the crucial fact that Kosovo enjoyed a clear
historic, geographic, political and nation/cultural identity, for a long time. This fact, as
already explained, was recognized even by the communist Yugoslavia, and was reflected
into the constitutional recognition of particular politico-territorial identity of Kosovo.
The entity of RepubliKa Srpska, on the other hand, never existed as a notion prior to
1990s. Indeed this entity is a direct product of the Serbian genocidal campaign against
Bosnian Muslims, and as such it has no historical, geographical or cultural identity. Any
further international legalization of Republica Srpska, in terms of upgrading its status to
that of an independent state, would be nothing less than legitimization of the Serbia’s
genocidal campaign to expand its state frontiers (if the mere fact of the existence of this
entity cannot be qualified as such). Furthermore, the geographical position of this entity,
meaning its stretching around the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia, makes almost
impossible its separation. Such a scenario would lead to the encirclement of Bosnian
Muslims by the new Serbian state (or Serbia), while the latter will serve as a barrier
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between the Croats of Bosnia and Croatia. Obviously, Bosnian Muslims and Croats
would be greatly disfavored by this kind of border rearrangements. As regards the
Macedonia, throughout post-Yugoslav era tensions in this country (erupting into limited
armed conflict in 2001) have been generating from the dispute regarding the
constitutional position of Albanians, who considered themselves discriminated (see
Bumci, 2000). The Ohrid Agreement, of August 2001, which ended Albanian armed
uprising, created a solid foundation for accommodation of the ethnic problems in this
country.49   Yet, the most important think, in relation to the Kosovo problem, is the fact
that Albanians in Macedonia have shown a permanent loyalty to the Macedonian state,
in terms of their commitment for respecting the territorial integrity of this state, which
they see as their country. No serious political force of Albanians ever engaged for
changing forcefully the borders of Macedonia, as Serbs tried to do in Bosnia and
Croatia. The fact that conflict of 2001 in Macedonia was of limited nature, while
Albanians and Macedonians do not share historic memories of wars and antagonisms
with each other (but the opposite), bolster the prospects of two groups living side by side
as a good neighbors. Finally, the Dayton Agreement has legally bounded the Bosnian
Serbs to the Bosnian state, while Ohrid Agreement made the same think with the
Albanians in Macedonia. But, as International Crisis Group (2005: 24) rightly observes,
“UNSC Resolution 1244 mandated a political process to determine the Kosovo’s final
status, indicating that the present de jure Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo is not
necessarily considered to be permanent.” This clearly demonstrates that these cases are
not considered at the same level by the international community.
    Giving the above complex situation surrounding the issue of Kosovo’s status, the
most viable solution seems to be a form of “controlled” (some prefer to call it
                                                          
49 The Ohrid Agreement can be reached at: http://www.ecmi.de/jemie, (lastly consulted on 13.06.2005).
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“conditional”) independence, an idea firstly advocated by some prominent international
think-tank institutes. In general lines, this would imply that the Albanians would reach
their objective of an independent state of Kosovo, but with limited sovereignty, at least
for certain time period. In the words of authors and supporters of this idea,50 Kosovo
would be formally independent, internationally recognized, but it would be placed under
a type of “new international protectorate,” most preferably under NATO and EU,
involving international military presence, international monitoring of key areas such as
justice, minority issue, police and defense. In addition, the Serbian cultural and religious
sites would be granted a special status, internationally guaranteed. This solution would
require specific legal arrangements, creating the “third legal precedent” in Kosovo, in
addition to unique features of humanitarian intervention and post-war international
administration. Such a scenario would turn Kosovo again into a metaphor of the
dynamism and new dimensions in international law and politics, challenging thus the
rigid interpretation of some traditional concepts of statehood and territorial sovereignty.
The final “decoupling” of Kosovo and Serbia, would be first and foremost in the interest
of the two nations- Albanians and Serbs, and of wider regional stability. Thus far, the
endurance of agonizing situation makes both nations hostage to each other, preventing,
therefore, the desperately needed democratic transition. It would create for Albanians a
permissive politico-territorial framework for democratic transformation and Euro-
Atlantic integration, while leaving no trump cards to national extremism. But most
importantly, it would release Serbia from a burden, inherited from history, which it
obviously can not bear. The acceptance of new realities, namely the independence of
                                                          
50 Proposal for “Conditional Independence”, was put forward by the Independent International
Commission on Kosovo (in 2000), and was supported by many other prominent think-tank institutes. This
option basically was based on the idea that Kosovo should bee formally recognized  but not empowered to
exercise sovereign authority in specific fields such as minority, foreign and defence policy, which for an
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Kosovo, would release Serbs from the destructive claws of the past and would open new
perspectives for their future. The Serbian crossroad is best described by the veteran US
diplomat engaged in the Yugoslav problem, Richard Holbrook (2005: 25);
The Serbs will have to choose between trying to join the European Union
and trying to regain Kosovo. If they seek their lost province, they will end
up with neither. But, if it can opt for the future over the past, Serbia would
have a bright future as an E.U. member, and the ancient dream of an
economically integrated, peaceful Southeast Europe(including Greece and
Bosnia) would be within reach.
 An independent Kosovo, with fixed and recognized borders, and integrated within
Euro-Atlantic structures, would be a great contribution to the stability of its neighboring
countries. This scenario would put a final line on the new geopolitical map of the region,
stabilizing the borders of Macedonia (and even Montenegro and Albania, let alone
Serbia itself). In any case, the presence of Euro-Atlantic political and security umbrella
remains an indispensable guarantee for the enduring stability of the region. The twin
approach of maintaining a strong military presence (e.g. in Bosnia or Kosovo) and
stimulating, not to say imposing, democratic transformations through EU integration
incentives, and “stick and carrot policy,” in a way has placed the entire region under
international tutorship. This scenario seems a viable solution for correcting the possible
consequences of misleading international approach to the post-war peace-building
mission in Kosovo. The prospect of granting to Kosovo an independent status and, on
the other hand, bringing Serbia closer to the Euro-Atlantic framework will help the latter
to rehabilitate from its traumatic past. A normal and democratic Serbia, which would
perceive the Euro-Atlantic integration not by inertia or in terms of short-term political
and economic gains, but as a unique chance to change itself, would surely hale to erase
                                                                                                                                                                          
unlimited period should be exercised by the international community (see  Independent International
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one of the major sources of region’s instability. Yet, the Serbian nation will pass this test
once it stops to perceive itself and to view the others in its neighborhood through
distorted and anachronistic historical lenses, and finds a moral force to face its ugly
recent past.
                                                                                                                                                                          
Commission on Kosovo, 2000; International Crises Group, 2005 : 12).
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       CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
A retrospective look in the Kosovo question vigorously demonstrates that in essence it is
a modern national problem, bearing the stamp of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, rather than a conflict between two nations who are wrapped up in a vicious
cycle of “ancient hatreds.” Having said this, the first logical corollary would be that it
basically does not differ from other similar ethno-national problems, exuberantly found
in the Balkans and elsewhere. What makes this problem unique, however, is the fact that
its protagonists, namely the Serbs and Albanians, have demonstrated astonishing
devotion to their “zero sum game,” with regards to their visions and options about
“ownership” over Kosovo. This fact makes their positions virtually irreconcilable. The
historical picture of the Kosovo problem, depicted in the second chapter, argued that
ever since they came under Serbian rule, the Albanian’s position has been primarily
shaped by the necessity to survive and to be treated humanely. Serbs, on the other hand,
base the legitimacy of their claim over Kosovo on myths and real or distorted historical
facts, while constructing their political behavior upon extreme nationalism. The
“Kosovo cult,” created during the nineteenth century by romantic writers and orthodox
clergy, has ingrained in the Serbian collective memory a deformed perception towards
the past and present. This destructive perception contradicts not only reality but also
rationality.
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The feeling of having been a victimized by history, irrational fear, distrust towards
“different” neighbors, and romantic euphoria, necessarily led to the violent expression of
the Serbian nationalist passions, at the expense of the “evildoing neighbors,” and Serbs
alike. The origin and evolution of the Kosovo problem, ever since 1912-1913 and in the
course of Yugoslav experiments, has to be seen primarily from this perspective. Serbian
state(s) have continuously demonstrated a striking loyalty to their way of looking at
Kosovo and Albanians, with whom they had to share the state from the beginning of the
twentieth century, through medieval lenses. Accordingly, the image of a constant enemy
was associated with the Albanians, against whom the Serbian nation needed permanent
“defense.” The Yugoslav experiment could not do much to change this mindset, and
hence the course of Albanian-Serbian relations. Thus, from the creation of the first
Yugoslav state (1918), and up until 1974, the Kosovar Albanians not only did not play
any significant role in power politics within the South Slavic state, but were subjected to
specifically harsh policies of Belgrade. The constitution of 1974, although it did not
meet Albanian national aspirations for acquiring the status of a nation, offered a modest
framework whereby Kosovo became a player in a balance of power game within the
Yugoslav state. The factorization of Albanians served as a pretext for the rise of the
“Milosevic phenomena” and violent behavior of the Serbian state/society during the
Yugoslav dissolution wars. In fact, Milosevic was just a loyal speaker of the Serbian
intelligentsia and politicized orthodox clergy.
    Looking at this problem from the perspective of international relations, the third
chapter argued that Kosovo is not a unique case only because it revealed once more the
fragile and contradictory nature of international law, and its inability to follow political
changes at the global level. Beyond this context, through the lenses of the international
administration in Kosovo one can understand and draw conclusions about the radical
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evolution of the traditional concept of peace operations in the aftermath of the Cold War.
In particular, the Kosovo case became an interesting laboratory for testing the merits of
liberal ideology, and its by-product: the democratic peace theory, which became the
ideological backdrop of international peace-building missions in the post-Cold War era.
A narrow outlook on the current international administration in Kosovo (by excluding
the broader context of the Serbian-Albanian dispute), however, highlighted some basic
weaknesses and challenges that the UN might encounter when launching operations of
this type. First and foremost, such missions can not be designed in “one day” (as it was
the case with traditional peacekeeping). They need to be timely and properly planed.
Second, the lack of a clear political mandate, and thus visions about the “way-out,”
might very easily hinder any prospect for a successful end. Third, the overall economic
development and creation of a secure environment permissive to protection of human
rights, is of crucial importance for wining of “hearts and minds” of the local population,
and avoiding the dangerous perception of peacekeepers as “colonizers.”
  The historic account of the Kosovo conflict highlighted the crucial corollary that this
problem resisted the time pressure with incredible strength. The international community
is trying to solve it through the expansion of a “liberal democratic zone,” which is the
basic strategy of international peace-building missions. Yet the architects of the
international post-war engagement in Kosovo have not grasped the basic lesson from the
Yugoslav drama. They neglected the very crucial fact that in their endeavor to pacify
Europe’s troublesome backyard they primarily need to rehabilitate Serbia, which was the
major driving force behind the wars and conflicts in former Yugoslav territories. The
fact that Kosovo is placed under international administration, but not Serbia, protects the
former but does not change the latter. And, as elaborated in the fourth chapter, Serbia
indeed has manifested a lot of symptoms indicating that it still suffers from the political
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and cultural mindset which created Milosevic, even after the overthrow of his regime.
Lack of courage, or the will, to face its ugly past (which moreover is being glorified),
hesitation to hand over the war criminals, the strong show up of the extreme nationalist
forces in all elections, are obviously a bad signal for Serbia’s neighbors, particularly for
Kosovar Albanians. On the other hand, the major challenge is still ahead. The cause of
dispute between the Albanians and Serbs is centered on the contradictory claims over the
political/legal status of Kosovo. Finding a feasible and workable solution for Kosovo’s
future is the major criteria for measuring the success of international involvement in this
problem, and wider regional stability. This thesis argues in favor of a solution based on
the formula of independence with limited, or controlled, sovereignty, at least for a
certain time period. This implies that the future independent state of Kosovo would be
placed under a kind of formal guardianship of international community (preferably
NATO and EU), while Serbian interests, meaning perseverance of cultural and religious
sites, would be accommodated through special arrangements. The continuous abuse of
the right to rule over Kosovo, lately manifested by Milosevic, left the Serbs with no
moral argument to claim that right again. The political reasoning, namely regional
security imperatives, give additional support to this argument, as there is no democratic
(or peaceful) way to impose a solution on Kosovo if the majority of its population would
oppose it. Finally, regardless of the course of developments in Kosovo and its
neighborhood, stability and prosperity of the region would continue to be dependent on
international presence, meaning that in particular NATO and EU shall continue to play
the role of a “baby-sitter” for quite some time. Only in this wider context the
international peace-building experiment in Kosovo, launched in 1999, can yield
sustainable pacification and stabilization effects.
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